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OPTING OUT OF LI ABILITY:
THE FORTHCO MING, NE AR-TOTAL
DEMISE OF THE MODERN CL ASS ACTIO N
*
Myriam Gilles
INTRO D U CT ION
In recent years, there have been hundreds of academic articles and
'
scores of books written about class action litigation. The law reviews

abound with doctrinal critiques, letters to Congress, moralist manifestos,

and economi sts' prescriptions for optimized class action rules. Reading it
all, one would certainly think that abusive class action litigation is running

amok in the United States.

On the doctrinal front, for example, Professor Martin Redish raises the

objection that much of contemporary class action litigation is, in reality, a
"lawyer-driven" hunt for bounty and that, when a court in such a case ap

plies Rule 23 procedures to a substantive federal statute, it is effectively

grafting a qui tam provision onto a law that contains no such remedy. Re

dish would have courts hold that Rule 23 may not be applied to lawyer

driven suits, lest it conflict with the remedial scheme of the substantive con

gressional enactment upon which the suit is based. Alternatively, he would
settle for legislation banning the widespread scourge of lawyer-driven class
2

actions.

From the moralist comer, Professor Charles Wolfram raises the some

what less nuanced objection that plaintiffs' lawyers are, well, immoral.

Professor Wolfram' s attack focuses on the "low state of ethical practice in

class actions" and the "sell-out lawyers who, for millions in fees, are willing
*

Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. A.B. 1993, Harvard; J.D. 1 996, Yale.Ed. I want to first thank Gary Friedman, who in fairness deserves more of a coauthor credit than a
thank you. I would also thank participants in faculty workshops at the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty
Forum, and Virginia, Duke, Columbia, and Hofstra law schools for lively workshops on this paper.
In particular, thank you to Jennifer Arlen, Mark Budnitz, Paul Carrington, Erwin Chemerinsky,
George Cohen, Chris Drahozal, Cindy Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Risa Goluboff, Michael Herz, Pam
Karlan, Jody Krauss, Melanie Leslie, Francis McGovern, Judith Resnik, Bill Rubenstein, Richard
Schragger, Bob Scott, John Setear, Stewart Sterk, Jean Stemlight, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Rip
Verkeuke, Stephen Ware, and Ted White for careful reading and helpful comments. All errors are my
own.

I.
My focus here is on class action litigation and scholarship between the mid-1980s and
the present. I have previously discussed the criticisms aimed at the class actions of the 1 960s and
'70s, which sought to desegregate schools, improve prison conditions, and obtain welfare rights for
minorities and other disenfranchised citizens. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 1 00 COLUM. L.
REV. 1384 (2000).
2.
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersec
tion ofPrivate Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 7 1 , 77-83.
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to sign away the rights of tens of thousands of faceless and lawyerless class
4
3
member s." The moralists purport to be pessimistic about "reform" effor ts

so long as a "siz able number of lawyers . . . are attracted to the big-money
5

rewards of mor ally compromised (but legal) professional work."

Law and economics, of course, has had a field day criticizing class ac

tions. Economic analysis has led some scholars to conclude that the agency
costs inherent in "entrepreneurial litigation" (that's law and economics for

lawyer-driven suits) produce inefficiencies that can only be addressed by a
free market for legal claims, in which attorneys may purchase outright the

claims of class members. 6 Related scholarship focuses on auctioning the
lead counsel position in class actions, 7 on the problems of collusion between
8
plaintiffs' lawyer s and defendants, on the concomitant problems of self
dealing by class counsel,9 or on the supposedly outsized leverage that class
0
certification gives even the most baseless of class claims. 1 Indeed, eco-

3.
( 1 995).

Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 8 0 CORNELL L . REV. 1228, 1 23 1

4.
Other moralist arguments relate to the values of promoting plaintiff autonomy and preserving plaintiffs' voices in the class action mechanism, see Roger C. Cramton, Individualized
Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions ": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L . REV. 8 1 1 ,
8 1 3 ( 1 995); insuring adequacy of class counsel and reducing opportunities for collusion between
and among counsel, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1048 ( 1 995); and identifying potential and actual con
flicts of interest between the class and its counsel, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma
of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 343, 1 376 (1995).
5.
Not content to disparage the morality of plaintiffs' lawyers or to take aim at their wallets,
Professor Wolfram levels his best shots at their egos: "what one needs to succeed in the field of class
action plaintiff lawyering are: ( I ) a plaintiff; (2) capital; (3) political skills; and (4) luck." Wolfram,
supra note 3, at 1 23 1 . Professor Coffee is notably more restrained, arguing that class actions (in
particular, mass tort class actions) raise concerns about possible collusion among adverse counsel.
Coffee, supra note 4, at 1 373-74.
6.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs ' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.

L. REV. 1 ( 199 1 ).
7.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share
holder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoss. , Summer 1985, at 5, 77-78; Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on
the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COL UM. L. REV. 650
(2002); Alon Hare) & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Coun
sel, 22 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 69 (2004); Julie Rubin, Comment, Auctioning Class Actions: Turning
the Tables on Plaintiffs ' Lawyers' Abuse or Stripping the Plaintiff Wizards of Their Curtain, 52 Bus.

LAW. 1 44 1 , 1 446-50 ( 1 997).
8.
See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption ofthe Class Action: The New Technology of
Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 85 1 , 853 ( 1 995).
9.
See Charles Silver, Class Actions-Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOP EDIA L.
& EcoN. 1 94, 1 99-200 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).

JO.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 ( 1 987); Bruce Hay
& David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L . REV. 1 377 (2000); William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs ' Bar:
Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 85 ( 1 994). Professor
Milton Handler put it most succinctly: "Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the
threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it
is a form of legalized blackmail." Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innova
tions in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. I, 9 ( 1 97 1 ).
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nomic analysis has been brought to bear on virtually every imaginable issue

related to class action litigation, prompting innumerable proposals for "re
form."

It is, I think, overly dramatic to say that all of this scholarship misses the

point. And yet, almost universally, the staggering heap of academic reform

proposals ignores a f undamental and transformative point: in the ongoing

and ever-mutating battle between plaintiffs' lawyers and the protectors of
corporate interests, the corporate guys are winning. And they are winning

because they have developed a new set of tools powerful enough to imperil

the very viability of class actions in many-actually, most-areas of the

law. In fact, I believe it is likely that, with a handf ul of exceptions, class ac
tions will soon be virtually extinct.

Two factors guide this prediction: the demise of mass tort class actions

and the rise of contractual class action waivers. First, as recently as ten years
ago, a significant percentage of all class actions were tort cases; by most

accounts, almost twenty percent. 1 1 Since that time, the mass tort class action

has met a fate similar to that of the Dodo bird. The latter was last seen on

the island of Mauritius in 1680; the former has rarely been glimpsed since
the issuance of broad class decertification opinions by federal appellate
courts in asbestos , tobacco, and product liability cases in the 1 980s and
2
1 990s. 1
Second, and more significantly, the vast majority of the remaining class

actions are based on some sort of contractual relationship. Virtually all con

sumer class actions, for example, arise out of some form of contract
(adhesive or otherwise) , just as employment discrimination class actions

arise out of employment contracts. Federal antitrust class actions necessarily

grow out of contracts (indeed, standing rules require as much) , and the same
is true for class actions relating to insurance benefits, BRISA plans, mutual

funds, franchise agreements, and an endless variety of other matters.

All of these contract-based class actions are, I believe, on their way to

Mauritius. Corporate caretakers have concocted an antigen, in the form of

the class action waiver provision, that travels through contractual relation

ships and dooms the class action device. Where class actions are based on

some sort of contractual relationship, this toxin is quite lethal. Developed in
4

the late 1 990s by marketers for one of the arbitral bodies, 13 among others, 1

the waiver works in tandem with standard arbitration provisions to ensure

that any claim against the corporate defendant may be asserted only in a

one-on-one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding. More virulent strains of the

1 1.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PuBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52-53 (2000).
12.

See infra P art I.

13.
See infra notes 1 20- 1 27 and accompanying text (charting the early development o f col
lective action waivers generally, and role of the National Arbitration Forum specifically).
1 4. See infra notes 1 28- 1 3 1 and accompanying text (reviewing allegations that major credit
card companies and issuing banks played a significant and clandestine role in the development of
collective action waivers).
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clause force the would-be plaintiff to waive even her right to be represented

as a passive, or absent, class member in the event some other injured person

manages to commence a class proceeding.

These provisions, which I term "collective action waiver s,"

15

still face

important judicial challenges, which have the potential to significantly limit

their scope. The first round of attempts by plaintiffs' lawyers to invalidate

collective action waiver s was rooted in state law unconscionability doctrine

and allegations that the waiver s were inconsistent with substantive federal
16
statutes. These arguments have met with failure everywhere except Cali
17
fornia, which has proven hospitable to the unconscionability challenge.

The plaintiffs ' lawyers, however, are not going down without a fight and

are beginning to bring second-wave challenges to collective action waivers,
which are subtler and more surgical than the broad state-law unconscion

ability attack. For example, creative plaintiffs' lawyers are arguing that the
collective action waiver 's implicit prohibition against cost-spreading across

multiple claimants precludes plaintiffs from vindicating federal statutory

rights in complex matters that would be expensive to litigate, at least where
1
each plaintiff has relatively little at stake. 8 On this theory, the anti-cost

spreading feature should be treated no differently than mandatory cost

splitting provisions, which current doctrine holds invalid where they would
19
preclude the exercise of federal statutory rights. The coercive imposition of
collective action waivers by parties with market power has also been chal
20
lenged under the Sherman Act. It remains to be seen how much traction

these second-wave challenges will find in combating the collective action

waiver s . Certainly, the scope of these challenges is more limited than the
21

broad first-wave challenges.

15.
I use the term "collective action waivers" rather than "class action waivers" because
these provisions, in their usual contemporary form, waive not only the right to participate in class
actions, but also the right to participate in classwide arbitrations or to aggregate claims with others
in any form of judicial or arbitral proceeding.
1 6.
See infra Section 11.C (discussing the successes and failures of "first wave" challenges to
collective action waivers).
1 7.
See infra text accompanying notes 1 82- 185 (discussing California cases voiding collec
tive action waivers on unconscionability grounds).
18.
A likely test case for these theories is brewing in federal court in New York, where nu
merous retailers are seeking to assert antitrust claims against American Express ("AmEx") as a
class, notwithstanding the presence of broad collective action waivers in the standard AmEx mer
chant agreement. As this Article goes to print, the matter is sub judice in In Re American Express
Merchants' Litigation, 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003).
1 9.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 5 3 1 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (finding that the party
seeking to avoid arbitration "bears the burden of showing [that] the likelihood of incurring such
costs" would prohibit that individual from pursuing her rights); see also Bradford v. Rockwell
Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 55 1 (4th Cir. 2001 ) (finding that the party seeking to avoid
arbitration has the burden of showing that the costs of the arbitration will deter her from bringing a
claim in the arbitral forum and, as such, prohibit her from vindicating her statutory rights).
20.

See In Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003).

The second-wave challenges apply only to claims alleging violations of federal statutory
2 1.
rights where each claimant has a relatively minor sum at stake in pursuing the action, such that the
costs of instigating an individual arbitration far exceed the costs of class litigation. These challenges
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Assuming the collective action waiver emerges more or less unscathed

from the current round of judicial challenges, it is only a matter of time be

fore these waivers metastasize throughout the body of corpor ate America
and bar the majority of class actions as we know them. It is tr ue that, to date,
22
the collective action waiver has likely had only minimal penetr ation; early
adopters include financial ser vices companies, telephone and Internet firms,

and a handf ul of other aggressive firms with a keen interest in avoiding class

action liability. But I regard it as inevitable that firms will ultimately act in
their economic best interests, and those interests dictate that virtually all

companies will opt out of exposure to class action liability. Why wouldn't
23
they? Once the waiver s gain broader acceptance and recognition, it will

become malpractice for corpor ate counsel not to include such clauses in
consumer and other class-action-prone contr acts.

Ultimately, owing to new technologies and the emphatic j udicial em

brace of arbitr ation over the past twenty year s, there are few areas of class
action law to which the collective action waiver will not extend. Technology

has vastly broadened tr aditional notions of contr act and acceptance. Any

transaction that may be cemented with the click of a mouse is susceptible to
2
a class action waiver. 4 Judicial preferences for arbitr ation, meanwhile, have
led courts to an unprecedented solicitude for unilateral "envelope-stuffer"

amendments of adhesion contracts-for example, the unread notice stuffed

in a consumer 's monthly bill stating that, by continuing to use her credit
2
card, or her telephone, she agrees to arbitrate any dispute that may arise. 5
Increasingly, these unilateral notices are taking the form of mass emails, or

even website postings, which have been held to support the imposition of
26
arbitration provisions and even collective action waiver s .
therefore could not succeed in a host of claims brought under state laws addressing the rights of
consumers, employees, commercial transactions, and others.
22. It is, of course, entirely possible that many companies have, in the very recent past, in
cluded collective action waivers in their contracts. Unless those waivers are challenged in court on a
motion to compel arbitration or otherwise surface during litigation, it is difficult to quantify just how
many are out there. Still, it is my sense-given the still-high number of consumer and commercial
class actions filed annually-that many (most?) companies have not yet written the waivers into
their agreements with potential class members. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Exami
nation of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459
(2004) (analyzing data on class actions filed over the past several decades and finding a recent up
tick in class action litigation).
23. See infra note 123 (concluding that most rational, well-informed economic actors will
determine these waivers to be in their best interests).
24. See infra Part Ill. See generally Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapt
ing Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 215, 243 (2000).
25.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration clauses need not be signed to be enforce
able. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
26. See, e.g. , Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding
that credit card holders were bound by an arbitration clause contained in their monthly bill); see also
Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Con
sumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 83435 (2002) ("[M]any companies simply use envelope stuffers, warranty provisions, or employee
handbooks to specify the available procedural recourse. Other companies obtain a signature on a
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One seemingly contract-free bastion of class action practice is securities

fraud litigation-specifically, the paradigmatic Rule IOb-5 case where the

plaintiff has purchased shares of the defendant issuer on the secondary mar
ket. Without a contractual r elationship between the plaintiff and the issuing

company, it would appear that there is no way for the issuer to impose an

arbitration clause or a class action waiver. And yet even these actions may

be susceptible to the waiver s : Is it not possible for a class action waiver to
be effected by some form of publication notice-perhaps coupled with ac

tual notice to all the exchanges and brokerage houses, and legends on stock
certificates-so as to allow securities issuers also to opt out of class action

exposure? Might courts not develop a doctrine that the waiver "tr avels with
the stock"? Would such a rule be any more astonishing than the other devel
opments here on our legal Mauritius?

In the end, I do not think the real story of the contemporary class action

is adequately told by the doctrinalists, the law and economics scholars or

certainly-by the moralists. I think an accurate appreciation of the present
and future of class action litigation r equires a heavy dollop of legal realism.

One needs to appreciate the evolutionary arms r ace that is afoot between

entrenched corporate interests and entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyer s. Schol

ar s and members of Congress are largely preoccupied with fine-tuning the

rules governing the class action. Corporate lawyer s, meanwhile, have plot
ted its demise.

My own view is that class actions-warts and all---d o far more good

than harm. I take it as beyond dispute that the threat of class action liability

plays a vital role in deterring corporate wrongdoing. And while one might

argue-as many scholars do--that class actions in contempor ary practice

may tend to overdeter, or that agency costs hamper the effectiveness of the

class action device, I am aware of no serious argument that we should ditch
class actions in their entirety. Everyone seems to agree that sound public

policy requires collective litigation be available for small-claim plaintiffs
who would not have the incentive or resources to remedy harms or deter
27
wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings.

In any event, class actions have to exist if we want to fix them. If com

panies may render themselves impervious to the class action procedure
simply by checking a box that says "I do not wish to be exposed to class

actions," then-ultimately-all of the scholarly r eform proposals will have

been for naught. Accor dingly, I would add to the heap of reform offerings

credit card or employment application, a form filled out in a doctor's office, or a loan agreement.
Sometimes the clauses are provided on-line, and 'accepted' by the customer who clicks 'enter.' ")
(citations omitted); Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us', WASH. PosT, May
22, 1999, at AO! (noting that American Express imposed arbitration clauses on its cardholders
through a nondescript insert in monthly bills).
27. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Ton Class Actionsfor Future loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002) (noting the domi
nant consensus among scholars and commentators is that the class action device helps to "correct
the obvious asymmetrical litigation power" seen in " 'low stake' claims---<:ases involving loss that is
large in the aggregate, but too small as incurred by each plaintiff for a competent attorney to con
sider any single claim economically worth prosecuting").

379

Opting Out of Liability

December 2005]

my own proposed amendment to Rule 23, which would simply provide that
the procedures set forth in the rule may not be waived by a standard-form
adhesion contract.

But I am not holding my breath. Instead, I offer a dismal prediction of

the near-total demise of the modem class action, organized as follows:
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I. THE DEMISE OF MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS

Mass tort class actions represent an early casualty in the shift of judicial

attitudes against collective litigation activity in general, and the story of their
demise may provide insight into the future of judicial treatment of other types

of class actions. My project in this Part is not really a normative one: I find the

doctrinal underpinnings of the cases that effectively ended "mass-class" to be

perfectly coherent (albeit not outcome-determinative), and I regard the utilitar
ian justifications

offered

by

courts

and

scholars

to

reflect

perfectly

understandable policy choices (albeit choices made from a menu of opposing,

equally understandable policy choices). Instead, I am interested in the very
28
to

fact of the demise of mass-class. Not that I suppose, Ktibler-Ross-like,

discern universal stages in the death throes of once-thriving procedural vehi

cles. Rather, I perceive that a Reagan-era judicial attitude adjustment
animated the near disappear ance of mass-class, and that this same basic ju

dicial mindset may yet drive even more momentous developments in the law
2
of class actions, as discussed in subsequent Parts. 9

Mass tort class actions never enjoyed much of a heyday. The prevalence

of individual causation and other issues in tort claims augured poorly for the
30
widespread use of class actions in mass torts from the get-go. Still, as col
3
lective action litigation in general took off around the country in the 1 970s, 1
the use of class actions gained traction in the burgeoning mass tort field.

Some inventive work by a handful of federal district judges in the late 1 970s

and 1 980s momentarily portended a bright future. In fact, as late as the early
1 990s, according to an influential RAND Institute study, tor t claims ac
32
And yet, within a

counted for nearly a quarter of class action litigation.

decade, commentator s were chronicling the demise of the mass tort class

action and arguing about whether there was any role at all for mass tor t class
33
actions going forward.
What happened?

Elisabeth Ktibler-Ross, in her famous work, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969), described
28.
the five stages of grief as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.
29.
I do not imagine this assertion is terribly controversial. The attitude shift I discuss in this
Section is part and parcel of a more general movement away from the principles that animated the
Warren Court's jurisprudence, the Great Society's legislative agenda, and the brief moment in U.S.
socio-political thought when issues of equality, access, and opportunity were paramount. See, e.g. ,
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It's Still Moving!, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003). See generally infra Part III.
30.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("A 'mass accident' resulting in
injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways.").
31.

See Gilles, supra note 29, at 150.

32.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4; Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of
the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 ( 1997).
33.
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A. The Short Story of "Mass-Class"

As mass tort cases began to inundate the federal system in the 1 970s and
34
the federal district courts were faced with a daunting challenge: they

'80s,

needed to find ways to dispose of tens of thousands of cases efficiently

without compromising existing legal rules designed to protect the interests

of individual litigants. Class actions were not an obvious place to look: in

amending Rule 23(b) in 1 966, the Advisory Committee had warned against

the use of the class action device in mass tort cases because of the likely
predominance

of individual

questions.

"In

these

circumstances,"

the

Committee cautioned, "an action conducted nominally as a class action
35
would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried."
So instead of pushing the class action envelope, district judges turned

first to the familiar common law principle of issue preclusion. Particularly

after the Supreme Court gave its blessings to the nonmutual offensive use of

collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

36

it became possible to

argue that if one plaintiff managed to establish a defendant's liability on a

common issue-for example, whether the defendant failed to warn workers

about the risks of asbestos exposure-then future claimants would be able to
3
avail themselves of that finding without having to relitigate the issue. 7

A pioneer of these effor ts was Judge Parker. Faced with thousands of as
38
and having heard identical

bestos lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas

liability evidence in case after case, Judge Parker turned in the early 1 980s

to collater al estoppel to bar defendants from relitigating particular liability
3
issues that had been decided against them at trial. 9 For example, having

34. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 ("The 1980s saw the rise of a new form of
litigation, the mass-tort suit. Consumers of drugs and medical devices, and workers and others ex
posed to toxic substances, sued manufacturers for injuries allegedly associated with these
products.").
35.

See FED . R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes.

36. 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) ("[Offensive collateral estoppel] has the dual purpose of pro
tecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy
and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.").
37. Some judges apparently preferred consolidation of cases under Rule 42 to issue preclu
sion. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1587, 1599 (1995) (discuss
ing instances in which judges consolidated thousands of cases pursuant to Rule 42).
38. The Eastern District of Texas was a hotbed of asbestos litigation in the 1980s and '90s;
in 1986, for example, over 700 asbestos cases were on the docket. Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and
Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429, 434 (1986). By 1990, "one out of every three civil cases
filed in the Eastern District of Texas was an asbestos personal injury claim." Deborah R. Hensler, As
Time Goes by: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tux. L. REV. 1899, 1900 (2002).
This led one commentator to describe the district as the "fertile crescent of asbestos litigation."
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV . 659, 660 (1989).
39. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Tex. 1981); see also
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 (commenting that judges, particularly in asbestos cases, found
themselves "trying the issues that the cases have in common over and over again in individual tri
als"); McGovern, supra note 38, at 662-63 ("Judge Parker ruled that offensive collateral estoppel, or
in the alternative, stare decisis or judicial notice, precluded a defendant's future assertion that it was
not liable for asbestos related injuries.").
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tried the so-called "state-of-the-art" defense,40 Judge Parker applied collat

eral estoppel to bar the defendant from litigating that defense in each new
asbestos trial. This approach, naturally, eased the congestion on the court's

docket and, not insignificantly, held out promise that terminally ill asbestos

plaintiffs might see resolution of their cases during their abbreviated life
times.

Presaging a recurring pattern that would come to characterize mass tor t

litigation, the Fifth Circuit reversed this attempt by the district court to
aggregate and streamline litigation.41 On this occasion, the court held Judge

Parker's use of collateral estoppel was inappropriate because, among other
reasons, there existed prior "inconsistent verdicts" from other courts on the
42
same liability issues. Under the Fifth Circuit's ruling, if a defendant has

managed to secure a favor able verdict on a particular issue-such as the

state-of-the-art defense-then a plaintiff's verdict from a subsequent jury on
43
the same issue will not be entitled to preclusive effect. This reasoning
44
effectively dooms issue preclusion in mass tor ts, where the very volume of

cases makes it inevitable that some jury, somewhere, will decide a given
issue in favor of the defense.

At this point, from the perspective of the federal district j udge swamped
5
with mass tort cases, the class action device surely merited another look.4

And so, in the early 1 980s, inventive federal district judges began to find

ways to use Rule 23 to address the mass torts of the day, including Agent
4
Orange, asbestos, tobacco, DES, Dalkon Shield, and a host of others . 6

40. Defendants in asbestos cases inevitably raised a state-of-the-art defense, claiming that
recovery should be denied because the hazards of asbestos were unknowable at the time of expo
sure. See, e.g., Jack Berman, Case Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: The
Function of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 10 AM. J.L. & ME D. 93, 105
(1984).
41.

Hardy, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).

42. Id. at 346 ("[T]he Court noted that collateral estoppel is improper and 'unfair' to a de
fendant 'if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or
more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.' ") (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979)).
43.

Id. at 347.

44. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REv. Lma. 213, 222
(1991) ("[T]he federal appellate courts have effectively eliminated issue preclusion as a means of
preventing the relitigation of duplicative claims, except in the narrowest of circumstances. These
doctrines have frustrated the ability of federal courts to deal with mass tort cases in an aggregative
fashion, thus requiring the repetitive adjudication of thousands of similar claims.") (footnote omit
ted).
45. See HENSLER ET AL, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that "by the mid-1980s . . . as the num
ber of mass tort cases mounted, trial and appellate courts had begun" to consider the use of class
actions to streamline and manage their dockets).
46. Up to this point in the story-nearly two decades after the adoption of Rule 23plaintiffs who had sought class status in mass tort cases had been almost universally rejected. See,
e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (lake pollution); Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (DES); Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (negligent surgery
in veteran's hospital); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (asbestos expo-
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Judge Parker, having been rebuffed in his other efforts to deal with the larg

est asbestos caseload in the country, certified a class under Rule 2 3 (b)(3) to
4
try the defendants' state-of-the-art defense. 7 Cautioning that the class would

likely be decertified at a later point in the proceedings for adjudication of
individual issues, Parker nonetheless believed that a one-shot trial on the
8
primary defense would save significant time and money. 4 This time, the

Fifth Circuit affirmed, observing in a 1 986 decision that litigating this "issue
consistently consume[s] substantial resources in every asbestos trial, and
49
[that] the evidence in each case [is] either identical or virtually so . . . ."

Also in the early 1 980s, Judges George Pratt and Jack Weinstein of the

Eastern District of New York certified a nationwide class of Vietnam veter

ans alleging injuries resulting from their exposure to dioxin-a.k.a. "Agent
50
While the court was certainly mindful of the

Orange"-during the war.

inherently individual causation and damages issues in mass-exposure cases,

it certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve the threshold government
5
contractor defense "that impact[s] equally on every plaintiff's claim." 1 The
court noted that "later stages of this litigation, especially those concerned

with individual causation and damages, 'may require reconsideration' of the
52
certification."

A similar tack was taken by Judge Williams in the Dalkon Shield
53
where he sua sponte certified a nationwide class of women
54
solely for the purposes of trying the issue of punitive damages liability.
litigation,

Putting aside, or putting off, individual questions of injury causation and

damages, Judge Williams reasoned that individual suits were "neither

sure); Snyder v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Love Canal
toxic waste).
47. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 282 (E.D. Tex. 1985), ajf'd, 782 F.2d 468
(5th Cir. 1986). Judge Parker certified the class and then ordered an immediate interlocutory appeal,
which was not then required under Rule 23(b), so that the Fifth Circuit could review his determina
tion before the class action proceeded.
48.

Id.

49.

Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986).

50. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
T HE COURTS (1986). The case was consolidated by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel in 1979, pre

liminarily certified by Judge George Pratt in 1980, and finally certified as a damages and limited
fund class action by Judge Jack Weinstein in 1983. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIV IDUAL JUST ICE IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDAT IONS, AND OT HER MULTI
PARTY DEV ICES 8-18 (1995).

51.

In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).

52.

In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).

53. Two million Dalkon Shield contraceptive devices were inserted in women in the United
States between 1970 and 1974, when the product was removed from the market. Some users sus
tained serious injuries such as "uterine perforations, infections, ectopic and uterine pregnancies,
spontaneous abortions, fetal injuries and birth defects, sterility, and hysterectomies." In re N. Dist. of
Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig, 693 F.2d 847, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); see also RONALD J. BACJGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD
CONT ROVERSY 12-13 (1990).
54. In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
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sensible, nor fair to those plaintiffs last to queue at the courthouse door

possibly to face no recovery against a defendant with its pockets turned out,

due either to the effect of a barrage of lawsuits, or to its refuge in Chapter XI
55
bankruptcy proceedings . . . ." Although the Ninth Circuit later reversed class
certification, partly on the grounds that neither the plaintiffs nor the
5
defendants had sought to try these claims under Rule 23(b)(3), 6

commentators widely applauded Judge Williams' creativity in using the
5
procedural tools at his disposal. 7

The courts in all of these cases applied legal rules in a plausible fashion

to reach results they believed just or efficient. These decisions reflect identi

fiable values, including a concern with fairness to plaintiffs such as the

mesothelioma victims likely to die before their cases may be heard, or the

Dalkon Shield victims who, in the absence of collective litigation, would

have likely found a destitute defendant by the time their individual actions

were called. Driven by these values and concerns-these moral intuitions
58
Judges Parker, Weinstein, Williams, and others construed Rule 23 and re
59
lated doctrine in a way that allowed collective action. What these courts
did, really, was to certify classes to try issues, as opposed to cases.

6f)

It was

obvious to these j udges that individualized issues such as injury-causation

and damages would require decertification at a later stage or some other
such procedural construction. But they saw no doctrinal problem with this

approach. After all, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) provides that "[w]hen appropriate

. . . an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect

55. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 332
(1983). At the time of class certification, Judge Williams determined that defendant A.H. Robins's
assets totaled $280 million and that it faced potential liabilities equal to or greater than that amount.
Dallam Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 893; see also Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of
Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REv 457, 485 (2002) ("With the bankruptcy filing of Man
ville in 1982, the true prospective dimensions of [mass] asbestos litigation began to dawn on
many.").
56. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 850-51. The plaintiffs and their counsel in the Dalkon Shield
litigation actually opposed class certification. 526 F. Supp. at 890; see also Stephen C. Yeazell,
Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 58.
57. See, e.g. , Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009,
2015 (2000) ("Judge Williams was right about judicial innovation . . . the courts have been 're
markably inventive' in addressing the problems of mass tort litigation with existing procedural
tools."). Judge Williams himself later suggested that he was right to certify the class: "the inequities
and shortcomings of the present system require that we judges work in an innovative fashion." Wil
liams, supra note 55, at 325.
58. See e.g. , Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976)
(upholding district court Judge Robert J. Kelleher's certification of a class of common stock share
holders, finding the judge had "determined to the best of his ability the course the litigation would
follow") ; Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (District Judge Skinner certified a
class of women in Massachusetts who were exposed to DES in utero).
59.

See McGovern, supra note 38, at 1882.

60. See Williams, supra note 55, at 326--27 ("One important, but both underutilized and
overlooked, aspect of Rule 23's repertoire provides the possibility of class adjudication not as an
entire case, but limited to one or more issues common to a group of cases.").
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1
2
to particular issues."6 Rule 23(c)(4)(A) may be opaque and underused,6
but commentators have long noted the general applicability of issue class
3
actions to mass torts,6 and it seems quite possible that such issue class ac
tions were exactly what a number of judges had in mind in certifying classes
64

during the late 1 980s and early 1 990s.

Their moment, however, was short-lived, as the judicial values animat

ing these mass tort class certifications ran headlong into a different set of

judicial values, epitomized by Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh
Circuit in the watershed Rhone-Poulenc case.65 Brought by a class compris
ing

1 20,000 hemophiliacs exposed to AIDS-infected blood,

the case

concerned the defendant's widely used blood-screening and extraction
product. 66 The district court certified a class solely to try the issue of defen

dant's negligence; at the end of the case, the jury would issue a special
verdict on negligence and, if the plaintiffs won, individual class members

would fan out to courtrooms across the country to try causation, damages,

and any other individual issues. 67

On a writ of mandamus, the Seventh Circuit decertified the class. Writ

ing for the panel, Judge Posner's focus was on the fairness of the procedures

to the defendant who "might easily be facing $25 billion in potential liabil

ity (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll

these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to

61. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(A); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790, at 271 (2d ed. 1986) ("The theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is that the

advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class on a represen
tative basis should be secured even though other issues in the case may have to be litigated
separately by each class member.").
62. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1475, 1499 (2005) ("The 'issues class' provision of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) has been infrequently invoked,
perhaps due to uncertainty as to how it is to be 'construed and applied' in conjunction with, or as a
substitute for, the predominance analysis of Rule 23(b)(3)." (footnote omitted)); Laura J. Hines,
Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 717 (2003) ("[Rule 23(c)(4)(A)]
clearly envisions that a court may conduct a common class trial of 'particular issues,' but beyond
that its meaning is opaque.").
63. See, e.g. , Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certi
fication of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263 ("[C]ases that do
not otherwise meet the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be certified
as issue classes.").
64. Cabraser, supra note 62, at 1499 ("[The issue class action] standard is more flexible,
enabling courts to examine the circumstances of a particular case to fashion the most efficient path
toward resolution [because] [t]he rule simply requires that the issue proposed for class treatment be
of 'central' importance to the disposition of the case.").
65.

In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).

66. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The
defendants' products extracted and concentrated proteins from donated blood through a process
called "fractionating" for more effective treatment of hemophilia. The plaintiffs alleged that defen
dants failed to properly screen donated blood for the AIDS virus, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff
class.
67.

Id. , 157 F.R.D. at 422-23.
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68
settle." Clearly disinclined for this core reason to allow the certification to
stand, Judge Posner then offered other reasons for decertifying in this case,
including: (i) the difficulty of applying numerous states' negligence laws in
a single proceeding; and (ii) the observation that plaintiffs had lost a major
ity of the individual trials against the defendant to date, suggesting that a
69
classwide showdown had not been earned.
Judge Posner's opinion swiftly became the model for other appellate
70
courts in decertifying mass tort classes. Most famously, in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. , the Fifth Circuit decertified "the largest class action
ever," consisting of current, former, and deceased smokers and their fami
71
lies. Again, the concern over the rights of defendants in mass tort class
actions was paramount:
In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramatically affects
the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and strengthens the
number of unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more
likely that a defendant will be found liable and results in significantly
higher damage awards. In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certifi
cation creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas
individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict pre
sents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse jud�ment is
7
low. These settlements have been referred to as j udicial blackmail.

Here again, plaintiffs sought only to try class-common factual questions.
Like Rhone-Poulenc, the Castano court found that differences in state law
68. Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1 F.3d at 1298; see also George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substan·
tive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 52 1 , 533 (1997) ("More openly than in
any other opinion, [the Rhone-Poulenc] court is concerned about the unfair pressure toward settle
ment that follows from class certification.").
69. Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1 F.3d at 1 299 (noting that at the time of the district court's certifica
tion, thirteen individual cases had been tried, with twelve defendant-verdicts returned).
As one commentator has noted, Judge Posner was in fact so concerned about the be-all and
end-all position that defendants found themselves in after a certification of a class in this era when
the Federal Rules did not yet provide for appellate review of certification decisions that he issued
the extraordinary writ of mandamus in order "to adjudicate the case without completely abandoning
his jurisdiction." Stephen D. Susman, Class Actions: Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield?,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 (2003). The Federal Rules were amended in 1996 to provide an inter·
locutory appeal of class certification determinations. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(f).
70. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 62, at 1 48 1 (noting that the "Rhone-Poulenc decision has
been vastly influential in all aspects of class action jurisprudence," and in particular, "its 'free
market' attitude toward the maturation of mass torts through repetitive trials in multiple jurisdictions
has held sway across the country").
7 1 . 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The complaint alleged that the defendant tobacco companies
fraudulently failed to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of nico
tine in cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature. Id. at 737.
72. Id. at 746 (citations omitted); see also Cabraser, supra note 62, at 1481 ("[The Rhone·
Poulenc decision] was avowedly procorporate. [The court] voiced the concern, found nowhere in the
Federal Rules, that a classwide trial on liability that the defendant lost would place it into bank·
ruptcy, or force it to settle, short of trial, because the risk of loss, rather than or in addition to the risk
presented by the merits, would force a corporate decision to surrender. Since such pressure would
not be present had the company faced only a series of scattered individual trials-with lower conse·
quences of defeat, and repeated opportunities for victory-class actions therefore comprise, in the
Rhone-Poulenc analysis, a form of 'blackmail.' ").
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and among plaintiffs failed Rule 23 's predominance requirement. And like
Rhone-Poulenc, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that plaintiffs in previous to
73
bacco cases had met with little success and essentially did not have enough
notches on their belts to warrant a winner-takes-all shootout at the OK Cor
74
ral. And, again, like Rhone-Poulenc, the court here was mainly concerned
about the power issues and the pressure that certification placed on defen
75
dants.
By this point, Judge Posner's snowball was well on its way down the
hill. The Castano decertification was followed, in quick succession, by the
76
Sixth Circuit's decertification of a class involving penile implants, the
77
Ninth Circuit's decertification of medical products liability classes, and the
78
Third Circuit's decertification of an asbestos class. Finally, the Supreme
Court got into the act, rejecting a prepackaged settlement deal in which
73. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (200 1 ) ; Cippolone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
74. The theory endorsed by the Castano and Rhone-Poulenc courts has come to be known as
the "maturity theory" of mass torts, first developed by Francis McGovern. McGovern, supra note
38; see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 747 ("[A] mass tort cannot be properly certified without a prior
track record of trials from which the district court can draw the information necessary to make the
predominance and superiority analysis required by rule 23. This is because certification of an imma
ture tort results in a higher than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to individual
adjudication."); Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1 F.3d at 1 300 (concluding that the claim against the defendants
had not reached a level of "consensus or maturing of judgment" that would follow from further
individual claims being filed and won); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass
Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 7 1 0 ( 1 989) ("[T]he maturity
prerequisite generates years of redundant litigation, diverting enormously valuable party, lawyer,
expert, and judicial resources from other productive undertakings.").
75.
Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 ("In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramati
cally affects the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and strengthens the number of
unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more likely that a defendant will be
found liable and results in significantly higher damage awards. In addition to skewing trial out
comes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas
individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even
when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These settlements have been referred to as
judicial blackmail." (internal citations omitted)).
76. In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1 069, 1 085-86 (6th Cir. 1 996). The court decertified this
nationwide class, at least in part because the trial j udge had failed to rigorously examine whether the
negligence laws of all fifty states were sufficiently similar to allow class treatment, on the grounds
that "[i]f more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face an im
possible task of instructing a jury on the relevant law, yet another reason why class certification
would not be the appropriate course of action." Id. at 1085.
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1 227, 1 23 5 (9th Cir. 1996). While the appellate
77.
court rejected Judge Posner's concerns about the undue pressure toward settlement incurred at the
certification stage, it nonetheless concluded that individual issues predominated over class issues
and that substantive differences in state law were inadequately analyzed. Id. at 1 233. As one com
mentator notes:
The [Ninth Circuit's] rejection of the Seventh Circuit's approach is interesting, however, be
cause the court in Valentino gives much greater attention to an explanation of the Seventh
Circuit's concerns about pressure toward settlement and placing the fate of an industry in the
hands of a single jury than it does to its conclusion that certification is inappropriate on
grounds of lack of predominance.
Priest, supra note 68, at 534.
78.

Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 6 1 0 (3d Cir. 1996).
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plaintiffs and defendants agreed to certify an asbestos class for settlement
79
purposes only. Once again, the refusal to certify was driven, in part, by
concerns with "fairness" to the defendants, given the coercive settlement
80
power of a certified class proceeding. And once again, the Court's action
found doctrinal cover in the notion that the predominance of common issues
is undercut by the purported difficulty of applying allegedly disparate state
laws-a rationale that has become central in the majority of these decertifi
81
cation cases.
At this point, courts and commentators appear to agree: the mass tort
82
class action is dead as a doornail. The Ninth Circuit has postulated that a
case having certain attributes could thread the needle, but that case has yet
83
to appear. And so, with all of this as background, I wonder: what does the
short history of mass tort class actions portend for the future of collective
litigation generally?
B. The Lesson of Mass-Class
The doctrinal underpinnings of the decertification cases are plausible but
shaky. To say the least, the cases are not driven by doctrine; the results are
not compelled by legal rules. While the drafters of the modem Rule 2 3 were
justified in doubting that the legal requirements of the rule would be met in
the typical mass torts case, given the inevitable individual issues of causa
tion and damages, those concerns went by the wayside with the advent of
84
the issue-specific class action pioneered by Judge Parker and others.
The remaining legal-doctrinal objections are fairly weak. It is simply not
true that mass tort cases enmesh courts in "individual" issues by requiring
the application of (allegedly) divergent state laws. First, the relevant state

79. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (vacating class settlement for
failure to meet commonality requirements of Rule 23(b)).
80. George Priest makes a similar point when he notes that "lurking beneath the surface" in
the decertification cases "is the fear that certification alone will be determinative of the dispute and
unfairly determinative if the underlying substantive merit . . . is low." Priest, supra note 68, at 523.
81. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001);
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We find it difficult to fathom
how common issues could predominate in this case when variations in state law are thoroughly
considered."); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Emig v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D. Kan. 1998) (court determined that because multiple states' laws
applied, the class was uncertifiable; plaintiffs limited the class to those governed by Kansas law).
82. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 370, 372-74 (2000) (describing Amchem
and Oniz as having "essentially frozen the development of the class action"); S. Elizabeth Gibson, A
Response to Professor Resnik: Will this Vehicle Pass Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2095, 2097-98
(2000) ("While Amchem and Oniz may not sound the death knell for mass tort class action settle
ments, the decisions certainly increase the difficulty of getting either type of class action certified by
a district court and ultimately approved on appeal.").
83.

See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).

84. Some commentators have argued that issue-specific class actions are not sanctioned by
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) unless the entire case meets the common-predominance requirement of 23(b)(3).
See Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L. REV. 567 (2004).
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85
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But second, in any event, the

application of divergent states ' laws to common facts hardly requires a trial
of individual issues; it requires the trial of several groups of common issues.

There is certainly no doctrinal impediment to such a procedure; indeed,

Rule 23(c)(4) specifically provides for the establishment of subclasses and
8
the trial of issues common to the class. 6

A more compelling, rule-based objection to most mass tort class certifi
cations lies in the "manageability" requirement of Rule 23(b ). Having

multiple subclasses, for example, may not be the most manageable or effi
cient solution for an overworked district court. But sometimes it surely is.

There is a ring of pretext, not to mention chutzpah, in an appellate panel

relying on manageability to reverse a Judge Parker, or a Judge Weinstein, or

any district judge who is fashioning innovative procedures precisely because
he is seeking to find ways to manage his docket in the face of an avalanche

of mass tort filings.

No, something else is going on here, and Judge Posner has told us ex

actly what it is: it is a j udicial empathy for the complaint of corporate
defendants that large class actions present a great deal of pressure to settle
8
cases. 7 Many commentators, unsurprisingly, have picked up on what they

perceive to be the outcome-driven nature of the judge-made rules restricting
88
mass tort class certification. More interestingly, the "political-policy" un

derpinnings of this case law have not gone unnoticed by some district court

85. At least two courts have certified nationwide state-law class actions where the law of all
fifty states was implicated. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Copley
Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995). Both of these cases were decided before the recent
wave of decertifications discussed in this Part, but remain relevant as examples of claimants and
courts willing to do the hard work of looking at and comparing the laws of a large number of juris
dictions. See Castano. 84 F.3d at 743 (decertifying class in part because the "surveys provided by
the plaintiffs failed to discuss. in any meaningful way. how the court could deal with variations in
state law"). Of course. it is possible that the plaintiffs today must meet a much higher standard in
order to certify a nationwide state-law class action-and that even the most minute nuances in state
laws may doom any such effort. See. e.f{ Chin v. Chrysler Corp.. 182 F.R.D. 448. 458 (D.N.J. 1998)
(refusing to certify class even where plaintiffs provided a detailed appendix of the variations in state
laws); In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., 182 F.R.D. 2 14. 222 (E.D. La. 1998) ("fPlroposed
.iurv charges and interrogatories fall far short of addressing the nuances in state law which must be
captured in any jury charge that does not invite reversal on appeal."). See generally Ryan Patrick
Phair, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem " in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 835 (2000).
.•

86. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 8 15, 856 ( 1999) (in decertifying a class of
asbestos-exposed workers, the Court ruled that its decision in Amchem had made it "obvious" that a
class encompassing both presently injured and future claimants "requires division" into well-aligned
subclasses); see also Hines, supra note 62, at 7 16-17; Romberg, supra note 63, at 297.
87. Corporate counsel constantly complain of the pressure that class action certification
places on them. As one noted insurance defense attorney argued, "[T]he system is broken. The class
action device is not meant to be used to force a settlement award that is disproportionate to what
would be achieved if someone actually had to litigate their case on its own merits. The device is out
of whack when used in this context." Lawyers Present Pros, Cons of Class Action Suits, CLASS Ac
TION REP., Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/0410 18.mbx (quoting
James R. Carroll, a partner with the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP).
88. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 84, at 580; Susman, supra note 69; see also Mary J. Davis,
Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157 ( 1998).
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judges. As district judge Arthur Spiegel wrote, in a decision certifying a
mass products class and refusing to follow Castano and Rhone-Poulenc:
Recently, several Circuit Courts have been highly critical of the use of
class actions in mass tort and product liability cases. While we recognize
the difficulties inherent in diversity based-class [sic] actions as outlined by
the Circuit Courts, we continue to believe that class action provides the
fairest, most efficient and economical means of dealing with these types of
cases . . . .
We also strongly disagree with those Circuit Courts which have al
lowed their apparent economic biases to influence their i nterpretation of
the requirements of Rule

23. 89

Noting that the courts in Castano and Rhone-Pou lenc were moved by
the observation that mass-class "certification dramatically affects the stakes
for defendants," Judge Spiegel made the point that the stakes are equally
affected by a refusal to certify:
[D]enying class certification makes it less likely defendants will be found
liable or responsible for lower damage awards . . . . Plaintiffs in individual
actions will have to bear a greater share of the cost and risk for maintain
ing their action as compared to plaintiffs in a class action. Often an
individual action pits a single plaintiff relying on his or her own resources
to fund the litigation against the vast resources of a large manufacturer and
the large law firms which represents [sic] it.
Obviously, the procedural rules affect the outcome of litigation. These

23 because of their
23. 90
91
Whether or not current mass tort class action doctrine is "correct," the
conclusion here is that a powerful judicial attitude has taken hold that por
tends poorly for class actions. Discomfort with the settlement pressure
exerted by class actions has led courts to decertify Rule 23(b)(3) damages
classes wherever current doctrine permits. And thus far, the cases most vul
nerable to this analysis have appeared in the area of mass tort, where
jurisdiction is founded on diversity, and where the presence of state law is
sues and choice-of-law problems has provided at least some doctrinal basis
for decertification. But recently-and here I return to my main thesis-there
has appeared on the scene a vehicle uniquely suited to allow predisposed
j urists to thwart collective litigation in the non-tort sector of class action
practice. All else being equal, this vehicle-the collective action waiver
should anticipate a warm judicial reception.
Circuit Courts seemed to ignore the essence of Rule

philosophical disagreement with the effects of Rule

89.

In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 1 72 F.R.D. 27 1 , 275 (S.D. Ohio 1 997).

Id. at 276; see also Cabraser, supro note 62, at 1480 ("Utterly absent from [Judge Pos
ner's] diatribe against class certification was any recognition that the victims had corresponding
rights. Indeed, Rhone-Poulenc and its progeny exhibited no consciousness that consigning common
issues to individual adjudication denies due process to the victims of mass wrongs.").
90.

9 1 . For a more thorough critique of the case law surrounding mass tort class action certifica
tion, see generally Hines, supro note 62.
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II. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIYER
In the multifaceted battle over class actions, entrenched corporate inter

ests and equally entrenched plaintiffs' lawyers and interest groups have
pursued competing legislative reform agendas, have pressed competing doc
trinal arguments in court and have offered competing policy justifications in

the scholarly and popular literature to support their positions. The dynamics

of this multifront battle are mirrored throughout the law, as the same two
sets of belligerents are squared off in fights up and down the substantive and

procedural landscape over medical malpractice, asbestos, securities litiga
tion, arbitration, and scores of other issues, each with legislative, litigation
strategic, and policy-theoretical dimensions.

For a variety of reasons, direct efforts in courts and legislatures to re

strict class actions have met with very limited success. The hugely

successful attack on mass tort class actions, first of all, has proven not to be

exportable to other areas of class action practice. Outside of torts, one will
rarely encounter in class cases the knotty issues of overlapping or conflict

ing state laws that Judges Posner and others relied upon to limit class

certifications. Most class actions are founded on federal questions, such as

federal consumer, civil rights, antitrust, and securities statutes. And any con

tract forming the basis of a putative class action-for example, franchise

agreements or insurance contracts-will invariably contain a choice of law

provision, and thus sidestep the conflicts problems that provide the doctrinal
(if not the animating) rationale for Rhone-Poulenc and related cases.

Direct legislative reform efforts have also proven unsuccessful.

92

There

have been some dramatic proposals, such as the Carter administration's at

tem t to create "private attorney general standing" under an amended Rule
9p
23, or Senator Jon Kyl's 2003 bill to prohibit plaintiffs' lawyers from re
9
ceiving fees based on a percentage of recovery in large class actions, 4 but
9
they have been overwhelmingly rejected. 5 For the most part, legislative ef
forts by true believers on both sides have given way to bland, incrementalist
96
bills such as the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act, which creates

92. See, e.g. Thomas Merton Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solu
tions for Class Action Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 507, 509 n.21 (2000) (reviewing
past failed legislative class action jurisdictional proposals).
.

93.
posal).

See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1 1 , at 21 (discussing the Carter administration pro

94. See Marcia Coyle, Times Five: Bolstered by High Fees in Tobacco Suits, Senate Bill
Caps Hourly Pay in Class Actions, DAILY Bus. REV. (Palm Beach), May 20, 2003, at A9 (reporting
on proposal by Senators Ky! and Cornyn to limit contingency fees earned by lawyers in suits result
ing in settlements or judgments of $ 1 00 million or more).
95.
Somewhat more successful are state-by-state efforts to tighten restrictions on class certi
fication. See AJG CEO Still Has Hopes that Ton Reform Will Pass, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Sept. 8, 2004
(reporting that Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas have recently
enacted legislation that would make it more difficult to bring class actions in state court).
96.

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") provides that:

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in contro
versy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class
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federal jurisdiction for nondiverse state law class actions implicating $5 mil
97
lion or more. Whatever one feels about the merits of this legislation, it is
98
probably nothing to get exercised about (unless one believes that well
connected plaintiffs ' lawyers are routinely "hometowning" corporate defen
dants in state court class actions around the country-a proposition based on
99
anecdote rather than evidence).
However, while the multifront battle concerning class actions has failed to
produce a clear victor, the defenders of corporate interests have enjoyed
complete and total victory in the late-twentieth-century showdown over

action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any de
fendant.
28 U.S.C. § 1 332(d)(2) (2005). CAFA essentially expands diversity jurisdiction to incorporate non
federal-question class actions. Christopher Whalen, Victory at Handfor GOP Tort Reform?, INSIGHT
ON NEWS, Feb. 3-16, 2004, at 27. Critics believe that CAFA will have negative effects on collective
action litigation, as "many cases will wind up not being brought because federal judges have been
constrained by a series of legal precedents from considering large class actions that involve varying
laws of different states." Stephen Labaton, Senate Approves Measure to Curb Big Class Actions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 1 , 2005, at A l .
97.
P rior to the enactment of CAFA, there were a number of other proposals to federalize the
class action mechanism. In 1 999, for example, Representative Robert Goodlatte of Virginia intro
duced the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act, which would have eliminated the complete
diversity requirement and allowed judges to consolidate individual claims in order to meet the
amount in controversy requirement. 145 CONG. REC. E l 026 (daily ed. May 19, 1 999) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte, introducing H.R. 1 875). According to one commentator, "The motivating force
behind this bill was the fear of class actions 'flooding into certain state courts.' In particular, Good
latte feared state court favoritism toward local lawyers when facing off against out-of-state
corporations" tipped the scales. Susman, supra note 69, at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
98.
Susman, supra note 69, at 16 (noting that the Class Action Fairness Act is not "all that
important" because while "generally premised on the notion that state courts are more conducive to
class action practice than federal courts," and "are recklessly biased and need to be cabined," the
author notes that the problem isn' t that "state courts are inappropriately 'friendly,' but that federal
courts are comparatively hostile"). But see Robert S. Whitman, The Class Action Fairness Act: A
Six-Month Assessment, N.Y. L.J. at 4, Aug. 23, 2005 (noting that while it is still too early to "draw
reliable conclusions about the effect of' CAFA, "the few cases decided thus far suggest that defen
dants view the act-and particularly its expansion of federal court jurisdiction-as a welcome
development in the defense of class and mass actions").
99.
See H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 13 (2003) ("[A] growing recognition among plaintiffs'
lawyers that certain State courts are particularly friendly to class actions and will readily certify
classes or approve settlements with little-if any-regard for class certification standards or the
interests of class members."). Compare Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action
Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters? 74 TuL. L. REv . 1 709, 1 7 1 5
(2000) ("[T]he prevailing sense among some practitioners i s that in many venues i n the Gulf
States-most notoriously Louisiana, Texas, and, until recently, Alabama-judges are more than
willing to certify almost anything that walks through the courtroom doors."), with Susman, supra
note 69, at 5 ("[W]hatever particular solicitude state courts once showed towards class actions has
disappeared in recent years.").
All this is not to say that there aren't a handful of extreme examples of cities and counties
where consistently high jury awards attract plaintiffs' counsel. See, e.g., Carlyn Kolker, Madison
County 's Litigation Machine, AM. LAW.: LITIG. 2004, Dec. 2004 (supp.), at 37 (describing Madison
County, Illinois, where "thousands of multimillion-dollar class actions and mass tort cases" are filed
annually and " [h]undreds of large corporations have found themselves on the losing end of the jus
tice system"; noting that last year alone, 106 class actions were filed in Edwardsville, and "more
than 1 ,000 individual asbestos cases were set for trial"-making this small town of just 261 ,000
residents "the bane of big businesses all over the country").
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arbitration. 1 And it is from this campaign-not the ongoing class action
battle, but the long-completed arbitration revolution-that the collective
IOI
action waiver emerges.
•

•

A. Arbitration Hegemony
As the mid-twentieth-century hostility to arbitration wz eventually gave
way to acceptance, w3 and then as late-twentieth-century courts moved from
accepting arbitration clauses to a posture of slavish deference, 1 04 corporate
lawyers came to understand that there were few bounds to the limitations
that may be placed on nominally "procedural rights" in clauses that enjoy
the protection of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). w5

100. Robert Alexander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA
Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 810 (2003) (noting that businesses have taken
advantage of the many benefits of arbitration because of a "series of developments in the law of
arbitration during the twentieth century").
10 l .

Professor Stemlight has noted:

One might call this the "do it yourself' approach to law reform: the company need not con
vince any legislature to pass revised laws, nor persuade any judicial body to change court
rules, but rather merely choose to eliminate the pesky class action on its own. If companies at
tempted to take direct and obvious legislative or even contractual steps to eliminate class
actions, they would likely encounter substantial resistance, even in this era of "tort reform,"
from those who credit class actions for many important achievements. By contrast, using arbi
tration to eliminate class actions is advantageous for class action opponents in part because it is
surreptitious.
Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. l , 11 (2000)
102. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 593, 619-20 (2005)
("[T]he law had been ambivalent about enforcing obligations to participate in private dispute resolu
tion at the expense of access to public processes. Judges guarded their own monopoly power and
regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.").
103. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding invalid agreement to arbi
trate issues arising under Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (holding that claims arising under Securities Act
of 1933 were arbitrable); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir.
1968) (finding that antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are inappropriate for arbitration), over
ruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985)
(announcing a "national policy favoring arbitration," which is not precluded by an arbitration
agreement that raises claims founded on statutory rights). A number of scholars have carefully
documented this doctrinal shift. See, e.g., Stemlight, supra note 101, at 126.
104. See Judith Resnik, Procedure 's Projects, 23 Civ. JusT. Q. 273, 289 (2004) ("Over the
course of the twentieth century, the attitudes of legislators and court-based adjudicators [towards
arbitration) changed.").
105. Pub. L. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)). Enacted in
1925, the FAA apparently "call[ed] for a resounding reversal of the previous antipathy toward arbi
tration clauses." Schwartz, supra note 100, at 810. The Supreme Court has held that "procedural"
questions which "grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition," John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964), such as "allegation[s) of waiver, delay or a like defense to
arbitrability," Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. l , 25 (1983), are for
the arbitral body to decide. So long as defendants can stuff as much as possible into this "proce
dural" box, their arbitration agreements will likely be upheld. But see Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005) ("Some courts have viewed class actions or arbitrations as a
merely procedural right, the waiver of which is not unconscionable. But as the . . . cases of this court

394

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:373

In a series of cases decided in the 1980s and ' 90s, the Supreme Court iter
ated and reiterated its view that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed
106
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." The Court
has relied on this pro-arbitration federal policy to find that claims arising un
der federal statutes such as the Sherman Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable, unless Congress
expressly states that a judicial forum is necessary for full vindication of the
107
underlying rights secured by the statute. As the Court has not yet encoun
tered a statute that explicitly states a preference for litigation over arbitration,
it is fair to say that all federal statutory claims are prima facie arbitrable.
Similarly, the Court has held that the FAA applies in state as well as federal
108
court proceedings and preempts state legislation affecting arbitration.
Giving further vent to its "healthy regard" for arbitration, the Court's re
cent jurisprudence has put more and more "gateway" issues of arbitrability
110
109
on the plate of arbitrators. While it remains (as of this writing) for courts
111
to determine whether a valid contract requiring arbitration exists, all other
have continually affirmed, class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer context,
often inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights. Affixing the 'procedural' label on
such devices understates their importance and is not helpful . . . ." (citations omitted)).
106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at
24; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 2 1 3 (1985).
107. See, e.g. , Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (1 989); Shear
son/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 ( 1 987) (holding that securities fraud claims brought
under Section IO(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. , 473 U.S. at 625.
108. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 17 U.S. 68 1 ( 1 996) (finding that the FAA pre
empted a state law requirement that a contract containing an arbitration clause include notification
on the first page of the contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 5 1 3 U.S. 265, 272 ( 1 995)
(rejecting arguments by twenty state attorneys general in finding that the FAA applies in state as
well as federal court); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 ( 1 987) (holding the FAA preempted
California Labor Code authorizing an action for the collection of wages " 'without regard to the
existence of any private agreement to arbitrate' "); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 , I O
(1 984) (holding that the FAA applies in state courts and preempting state legislation interpreted to
protect franchisees from unfair arbitration agreements). Compare David S. Schwartz, Correcting
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration
Act, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas., Winter/Spring 2005, at 5, 5 ("Despite its constant, talismanic repeti
tion, the 'national policy favoring arbitration' is illusory and highly dubious federalism."), with
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the legislative History of the Fed
eral Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. RE v. 1 0 1 , 105 (2002) ("[T]here are 'strong indications' in
the legislative history that the drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court.").
109. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 573 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26;
see also Elizabeth M. Avery, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Class Actions and the Future of
Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 24 (discussing the "Court's growing body
of jurisprudence suggesting a limited role for the courts in disputes governed by arbitration agree
ments").
1 10. See infra text accompanying notes 1 5 1-155 (discussing the Court's recent grant of cer
tiorari in Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005). cert. granted. 1 25 S.
Ct. 2937 (2005), to resolve the question of whether a court or an arbitrator should determine
whether a contract containing an arbitration clause is void ab initio).
1 1 1 . Judges still retain some authority in determining whether to compel arbitration. In re
viewing motions to compel, courts must first determine whether the arbitration clause at issue is
valid. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2000); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 2 1 8 (courts must compel
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issues concerning the scope of arbitration agreements are now for arbitrators
2
to decide. 1 1 So are questions such as whether classwide arbitration is avail
3
able in a given case. 1 1

In sum, the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence over the past

thirty years has evinced an incredibly expansive view of the FAA. And

while the full import of this national policy favoring arbitration has been
5
criticized by many, 1 14 including members of the Court itself, 1 1 there is no
reason to believe the Court will swing back to a more nuanced interpretation
6
of the FAA. 1 1

Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, corporate lawyers and

business executives naturally sought ways to expand the reach of arbitration

clauses, sharing their tactical insights in trade journals, at conferences, and

arbitration of disputes within valid arbitration agreements under the FAA). If the clause is found
valid, the court must then determine whether the dispute between the parties is within the scope of
the clause and suitable for a nonjudicial forum. See Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d
677, 679 (8th Cir. 2001); Daisy Mfg. Co. v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1 994);
Painewebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1 990). If the court finds the arbitration
clause valid and the dispute arbitrable, the party opposing arbitration then bears the burden of prov
ing any defenses to the enforcement of the agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). Because of the presumption favoring arbitration and the
breadth of most arbitration clauses, courts have not surprisingly found most clauses valid and most
disputes within the scope of the agreement. See First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945
( 1 995); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. , 460 U.S. at 24.
112. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity,
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 80 (2003) ("[T]hese cases show a
trend toward moving . . . enforceability questions into the arbitrator's purview, consistent with the
sweeping pro-arbitration policy that will result in more cases . . . going to arbitration.").
113. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality concluding that
the arbitrator, not the South Carolina courts, should have determined whether, as a matter of contract
interpretation, Green Tree's arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
( 1 995); see also infra text accompanying notes 132-169.
1 1 4. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995);
T homas E. Carbonneau, A rbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TuL. L.
REV . 1945 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Schwartz, supra note 108; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking
the Constitutionality of the Supreme Coun's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment
of Jury Trial, Separation ofPowers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
115. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 1 05, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis
senting) ("There is little doubt that the Court's interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far
beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it."); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (" [T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edi
fice of its own creation."). Justice Thomas, in particular, has been a strong voice of dissent in nearly
every FAA case to come before the Court. See, e.g., Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(" [T]he FAA cannot be a ground for pre-empting a state court's interpretation of a private arbitration
agreement."); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the choice-of-law
provision in an arbitration agreement should make it an issue of state law, thus not governed by the
FAA). Justice Thomas's basic position is that Congress never intended the FAA to apply to state
courts, so the Court's decisions trigger important federalism concerns.
1 16. See Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Negotiating and Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in 2003:
Insuring Against a Failure of Professional Responsibility, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV . 27 1, 287 (2003)
(" [T]he use of arbitration clauses and referrals to arbitration continues to increase unabated.").
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7
in high-level, top-secret planning sessions. 1 1 Indeed, by the early 1 990s an
8
1
1
ADR cottage industry was in full bloom,
fueled not by people interested
in "alternative dispute resolution"-a sunny moniker reflecting the earnest,

academic roots of the movement in the 1 960s-but by corporations seeking
ways to decrease their liability risks.

In this fertile environment, corporate lawyers created the collective ac

tion waiver and wrapped their newborn in the cloak of an arbitration clause,
protecting it against attack with the now sacrosanct policies of the FAA. 1 19
B. The Birth of the Collective Action Waiver
In the late 1 990s, trade-journal articles first appeared encouraging cor

porate counsel to consider redrafting contracts to

include provisions

requiring consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class ac
tions or even group arbitrations. A 1 997 "Practice Tips" column in the

Franchise Law Journal suggested that, in the wake of a nine-figure class

action jury verdict in favor of Meineke Discount Muffler franchisees against
the home office,

120

franchisors should seriously consider requiring:

each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in a sepa
rate arbitration. Since many (and perhaps most) of the putative class
members may never do that, and because arbitrators do not issue runaway
awards, strict enforcement of an arbitration clause should enable the fran
121
chisor to dramatically reduce its aggregate exposure.

Another corporate attorney writing in a business j ournal recommended

that commercial clients take full advantage of the favorable Supreme Court

1 1 7 . See Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1 1 , 2005). This class
action complaint filed on behalf of all credit and charge card holders alleges that the defendant
banks' inclusion of collective action waivers in cardholder agreements is a violation of federal anti
trust laws. Id. The complaint further alleges that defendants held a series of secret meetings to
discuss the implementation of these waivers. Id., see infra text accompanying notes 1 28- 1 3 1 .
1 1 8.
Resnik, supra note 102, a t 6 1 7- 1 8 ("[T]he market i n ADR appears t o b e flourishing
with conferences (on topics such as 'Court ADR'), services (through firms with names such as
'EndDispute' or 'JAMS' . . . ) law school classes, model rules, and an ever-expanding literature
addressing the progress and challenges." (footnotes omitted)).
1 1 9.
Collective action waivers are not the only problematic clauses grafted onto arbitration
provisions. P rofessor David Schwartz writes of a number of "remedy-stripping" clauses folded into
broad arbitration agreements by "overzealous drafters" who hoped that "the courts' enthusiasm for
enforcing arbitration clauses would spill over onto the logically separable remedy limitation, one
that would have had no chance of enforcement without the arbitration clause." Schwartz, supra note
1 1 2, at 49-50.
1 20.

Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, 958 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D.N.C 1 997), rev 'd on

other grounds, 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998).
121.
Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE
L.J. 1 4 1 , 1 4 1 ( 1 997). The author is a partner at the law firm Wiggin & Dana, which represents a
number of franchisors. Citing other cases in which franchisors inserted such agreements into their
franchise agreements and escaped massive liability, the author warned that "[i]n this day and age . . .
most class action suits against established franchisors will involve impressively large aggregate
damage claims . . . . [And while] [a]n arbitration clause may not be an invincible shield against class
action litigation, it is surely one of the strongest pieces of armor available to the franchisor." Id. at
142.
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arbitration jurisprudence by incorporating class action waivers into arbitra.
.
.
22
Numerous reports o f companies
tion cl auses whenever practica1. 1

implementing these sorts of provisions also began to appear in the popular
23

press throughout the late 1 99Os. 1

This movement accelerated in 1 999, when the National Arbitration Fo

rum ("NAF''), a for-profit arbitral body designated in the arbitration
2
provisions of many large companies, 1 4 disseminated marketing materials

cautioning corporate attorneys that the only way to insulate their clients from
class action liability in general-and Y2K computer class action liability in

particular-was to implement arbitration provisions containing terms that
25
expressly waive the right to class treatrnent. 1 Companies were responsive to
this pitch. American Express, for example, sent notices to some two million

small-merchant accounts stating that, henceforth, their merchant agreements
would be deemed to include arbitration provisions containing express class
2
waivers; 1 6 if the merchant objected, it was free to terminate its relationship

1 22.
Kay 0. Wilburn, A Clause You Don't Want to Overlook, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 1 996,
at 55, 57-58.
1 23. For example, Alan Kaplinsky, an attorney representing major financial services institu
tions, was quoted as saying that "[a]rbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action lawsuits against
lenders . . . . Stripped of the threat of a class action, plaintiffs' lawyers have much less incentive to
sue." P aul Wenske, Some Cardholders Are Signing Away Their Right to Sue, KAN. CITY STAR, May
I , 2000, at A8; see also Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 702 (2004) (citing Class
Action Bans in Arbitration Pacts Could Create Limits on Substantive Rights, U.S. L. WK., Nov. 25,
2003, at 2294 (Robert P. Davis, Esq. stated that he counseled his clients that the primary advantage
of arbitration is that it allows them to avoid class actions: "despite the potential disadvantages to
employers who require arbitration, the primary question asked by companies considering arbitration
is: 'Can we cut off class and collective actions by requiring arbitration?' ")); Michael Ferry, Con
sumers: Forced Arbitration Is Bad, ST. Loms PosT-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1 992, at 7D ("The banks,
[for example,] are rewriting their consumer contracts-such as credit-card agreements and account
agreements-to state that either the bank or a customer will refer a dispute to binding arbitra
tion. . . . [T]he banks . . . are afraid of big jury verdicts and big class actions against them. They
think arbitrators will be less likely than juries to give customers big damage awards."); Caroline E.
Mayer, The Price is Rights: People Are Signing Away Consumer Protections-and Many Don't Even
Know It, NEWSD AY , May 30, 1 999, at F8 (reporting that a growing number of companies are "re
writing the fine print of their contracts and sales agreements to require that consumers agree, in
advance, to give up their right to sue and submit disagreements to arbitrators [and that] [s]uch
clauses also bar consumers from participating in class action suits").
124.
NAF is "the exclusive arbitration administer of American Express, Discover (as of 2005),
MBNA, and until 2003, First USA (now owned by Chase). It is also designated as an arbitration
administrator for Capital One, Chase, Citibank, Diners Club, Household, and P rovidian." Complaint
'l[ 1 20, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1 1 , 2005).
1 25. Complaint, 'l[ 23 B, Corbett v. National Arbitration Forum, CGC-04-43 1-430 (May 17,
2004) (discussing an April 16, 1998 letter from NAF's director to a corporate defense lawyer warn
ing that "the 'class action bar' is threatening lawsuits over the Y 2K issue," and warning that the
" 'only thing' that will 'prevent' such suits is the adoption of an NAF arbitration clause 'in every
contract, note and security agreement' "); see also id. 'l[ 22 D (also alleging that an NAF executive
wrote to a prospective client in 1999 that "[a] number of courts around the country have held that a
properly-drafted arbitration clause in credit applications and agreements eliminates class actions"
and that NAF "will make a positive impact on the bottom line").

1 26. The clause applies only to "small merchants," defined by American Express as those
transacting less than $ 10 million in charges annually. In its contracts with these small merchants,
American Express retains the right to unilaterally amend by furnishing written notice, such as "en
velope stuffers" that accompany monthly statements. P laintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition
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with American Express and discontinue acceptance of the card. The AmEx
waivers are pretty typical: they provide that the claimant may not participate
in any class action or classwide arbitration, and may not join its claims with
127
those of any other merchant inside the arbitral arena.
1 . The Clandestine Role of the Credit Card Industry

The development of collective action waivers was also aided by a brain
trust of lawyers and business executives in the credit card industry. In a class
action complaint filed in August 2005 against the major U . S . card-issuing
banks, plaintiffs allege that defendants held a series of high-level, top-secret
meetings beginning in 1 998 to discuss the imposition and use of collective
128
action waivers.
Towards those ends, plaintiffs allege the defendants
formed internal organizations "devoted to collectively promoting and im
plementing" these waivers by filing "amicus curiae briefs for the purpose of
persuading courts to enforce onerous and one-sided arbitration clauses," and
"filing countersuits against class action lawyers and suits for abuse of proc
129
ess," among other activities. According to the complaint, the defendant
banks-normally cut-throat and fierce competitors-in this instance ille
130
gally colluded to fix material terms offered to cardholders.
The plaintiffs' allegations of defendants' numerous clandestine meetings
131
and other communications, which have withstood a motion to dismiss, tell
a fascinating story of an entire industry conspiring to avoid class action ex
posure by working together on drafting, implementing, and defending
to Motion to Compel Arbitration at 7, 1 1 , In Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD)
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003).
1 27. The clause provides: "You will not have the right to participate in a representative capac
ity or as a member of any class of claimants pertaining to any claim subject to arbitration . . . . There
shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis or on any basis
involving Claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public,
other establishments which accept the Card (Service Establishments), or other persons or entities
similarly situated. Furthermore, Claims brought by or against a Service Establishment may not be
joined or consolidated in the arbitration with Claims brought by or against any other Service Estab
lishment(s), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by all parties." Id. app. tab 4 (quoting Terms and
Conditions for American Express Card Acceptance, dated October 1 999).
1 28.
Complaint 'Jl 2, Ross v. Banlc of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Plaintiffs claim that
defendants' collusive actions constitute an anticompetitive restraint on trade in violation of federal
antitrust laws and seek declaratory judgment and an injunction against continued use of collective
action waivers, as well as the withdrawal of all currently pending motions to compel arbitration. Id.
1 29.
Id. 'll'l! 97-1 1 8. One internal group was the "Arbitration Coalition," whose primary re
sponsibility was to identify potential members (that is, banks and credit card companies seeking to
reduce or eliminate their exposure to class actions by consumers). Id. (citing correspondence indi
cating that the Arbitration Coalition held at least sixteen meetings and conference calls from
November 1 7, 1999 to October 2003 during which it identified and contacted "[l]eading companies
that have adopted or are considering adopting arbitration to resolve disputes with their consumer
customers"). Another internal group, the "Consumer Class Action Working Group," "was spawned
from the Arbitration Coalition's ongoing frustrations with class actions." Id. 'll'll 1 1 3-14.
1 30.
Id. 'll'l! 1 05--07 (citing email correspondence and meeting agendas in which the defendants
discuss the "need to control class action litigation" by "sharing our thoughts and materials").
131.
Memorandum and Order, Ross v. Am. Express Co., 04-Civ. 5723 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2005).
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collective action waivers. And for our purposes here, the plaintiffs' story

foreshadows the lengths to which corporate defendants are willing to go to

implement these waivers and defend them against legal challenge.
C. First- Wave Challenges

Inevitably, some of the companies that implemented class action waivers

have since found themselves as the defendants in putative class actions. As

these defendants asserted the waivers as a defense, plaintiffs' lawyers looked

for ways to challenge their enforceability. For the most part, these "first

wave" challenges took one of two forms : (i) that the waivers are uncon
scionable as a matter of state law, or (ii) that compelling arbitration is
facially inconsistent with the underlying federal statute upon which claims

are based.

1. Unconscionability
Plaintiffs challenging collective action waivers looked first to the com
32
Under the FAA, a party

mon law contract doctrine of unconscionability. 1

may oppose arbitration on such "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
133
revocation of any contract," and the Supreme Court has held that state-law
13
unconscionability can be such a basis. 4
B asic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unen

forceable and unconscionable if it is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable: "the former focusing on ' oppression' or ' surprise' due to

unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' re
135
sults."

Unconscionability analysis has met with occasional success as a basis

for challenging arbitration clauses generally, such as in cases where the

claimant is forced to trek across the country to file his arbitration, or where

the rules spelled out in the arbitration agreement force him to give up the

1 32.
See, e.g .. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 376, at 21 ( 1 962) (stating that standard
ized contracts offered to individuals on an "accept this or get nothing basis" are subject to vigilant
judicial scrutiny to avoid enforcement of unconscionable provisions).
133.

See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

1 34.
Doctor's Assocs .. Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 1 7 U.S. 68 1 , 687 ( 1 996) (holding that "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening § 2" of the FAA).
135.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 1 1 3 P.3d 1 1 00, l l08 (Cal. 2005). The court continued:

The procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of

adhesion, "which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." . . . Substan
tively unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be described as
unfairly one-sided.

Id.
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3
right to, say, pumtlve damages, or other remedies. 1 6 But the courts'

reactions to unconscionability challenges leveled at collective action waivers
3
have been far less positive: with the exception of a handful of cases 1 7 (mostly
38
1
out of the Ninth Circuit and California)
finding such clauses substantively

unconscionable, a vast maj ority of decisions have upheld collective action
3
waivers against this challenge. 1 9

1 36. See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1 547, 1551 (I I th Cir. 1985) (arbitration clause
unconscionable because it gave the drafting party an "arbitration option," while forcing the non
drafting party to arbitrate all claims); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 621 P.2d 165, 173 (Cal. 1981)
("[The arbitration clause is unconscionable] because it designates an arbitrator who, by reason of its
status and identity, is presumptively biased in favor of one party . . . ."); Ramirez v. Circuit City
Stores Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 1 6, 920 (Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration clause unconscionable because it
barred punitive damages); P atterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 564 (Ct.
App. 1993), rev. denied, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 ( 1 993) (arbitration clause unconscionable where it
required all disputes to "be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum, Min
neapolis, Minnesota," a far distance for plaintiffs to travel).
1 37. See Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 66, 1 1 78 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (find
ing bar on classwide arbitrations unconscionable under Washington law); Lozada v. Dale Baker
Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1 1�5 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (striking down collective action
waiver as unconscionable and suggesting that it is impermissible to use arbitration provisions to
completely eliminate exposure to class liability, and potentially to any liability at all, given that
individual claims would have been impractical to pursue); P owertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (same); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002)
(explaining that it was neither the class waiver nor the arbitration clause, taken alone, that rendered
the provision void, but the use of these provisions in combination which raised suspicions of an
unconscionable adhesion contract at work), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002); see also Jean R.
Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CoNTEMP. P Ross., Winter/Spring 2004, at 75,
78 n. 1 3 (2004) (citing additional cases striking down collective action waivers as unconscionable).
1 38.

See infra text accompanying notes 1 39-150.

1 39. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2005); Iberia Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin.,
Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 63 1 , 638 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("We also reject Snowden's argument that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable as
unconscionable because without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain her legal
representation given the small amount of her individual damages."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1 087
(2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., 244 F.3d 8 1 4, 8 1 8 (I I th Cir. 200 1); Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc' y, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 1 360 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Mcintyre v. Household Bank, 2 1 6 F. Supp. 2d 7 1 9, 724 (N.D. Ill.
2002); Vigil v. Sears Nat'! Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. La. 2002); Pick v. Discover Fin. Servs.,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-935-SLR, 2001 WL 1 1 80278, at *S (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001) ("[I]t is generally
accepted that arbitration clauses are not unconscionable because they preclude class actions.");
Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 1 63 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 89, 1 195 (S.D. Cal. 2001 ) (rejecting argument
that arbitration clause was unconscionable because it denied consumers the ability to pursue class
actions and thereby vindicate small claims); Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574, 578--79
(W.D.N.C. 2000); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 922 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Frerichs v.
Credential Servs. Int'!, 1 999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228 1 1 (N.D. Ill . 1999); Zawikowski v. Beneficial
Nat'I Bank, No. 98 C 2 1 78, 1999 WL 35304, at *2 (N.D. Ill . Jan. 1 1 , 1999); Howard v. Klynveld
P eat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), ajf'd, 173 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1 999);
Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life &
Health, 23 P.3d 1 249, 1 253 (Colo. Ct. App. 200 1 ) ("[A]rbitration clauses are not unenforceable
simply because they might render a class action unavailable."); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790
A.2d 1 249, 1 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 200 1); Brown v. KFC Nat'! Mgmt. Co., 92 1 P.2d 146 (Haw.
1996); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488 (Ill . App. Ct. 2003); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872
A.2d 735 (Md. 2005); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001 ) (enforcing class action provision against unconscionability challenge and concluding that
there is no "overriding public policy in favor of class actions"); Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759
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a. California 's Minority Position

California is currently the only state whose courts have regularly struck
down collective action waivers in standard-form agreements as unconscion
4
able. 1 0 In nearly all of these cases, courts have focused on the inherent
unfairness of a contractual clause that prevents claimants "from seeking re
dress for relatively small amounts of money" 141 and thus immunizes
defendants from class or representative suits. 1 42
Recently, a fractured California Supreme Court endorsed these interpre

tations of its state's unconscionability doctrine.

In Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, the majority held that "at least some class action waivers in
consumer contracts are unconscionable under California law." 1

43

Specifi

cally, the Discover Bank case focused on collective action waiver provisions

that the defendant credit card company imposed upon the consumer as "an
amendment to its cardholder agreement in the form of a 'bill-stuffer' that he
44
would be deemed to accept if he did not close his account." 1 The court held

that such adhesive provisions are unconscionable under California law
where they "may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are
4
contrary to public policy." 1 5 While acknowledging that California is clearly

in the minority on this issue, the court was moved by the "important role of
46
class action remedies in California law," 1 as "the only effective way to halt
47
1
and redress [consumer] exploitation."

N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.
2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2003); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc.,
17 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
140. See, e.g., Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2002); ACORN v.
Household Int'!, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.
2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d
862 (Ct. App. 2002); Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001).
141.

Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.

142. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175 ("[Bly barring class arbitration in a contract of its own
drafting, the defendant 'sought to create for itself virtual immunity from class or representative
actions despite their potential merit . . . .' " (quoting Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867)); Ting v.
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2002), modified, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
collective action waiver unconscionable because it "will prevent class members from effectively
vindicating their rights in certain categories of claims, especially those involving practices applica
ble to all members of the class but as to which any consumer has so little at stake"); Szete/a, 118
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868 ("The clause is not only harsh and unfair to Discover customers who might be
owed a relatively small sum of money, but it also serves as a disincentive for Discover to avoid the
type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in the first place . . . . The potential for mil
lions of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot
be ignored.").
143.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).

144.

Id.

145.

Id.

146.

Id. at 1106.

147.

Id. at 1105.
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An interesting upshot of this ruling falls under the rubric of choice-of- .
4
law. 1 8 The dissent in Discover Bank warned darkly that the majority decision
4
will establish California as a "magnet" jurisdiction for plaintiffs' lawyers. 1 9
On this view, plaintiffs who are otheiwise bound by collective action waiv

ers will rush into California to file suit, seeking to hide behind the Discover

Bank decision. This fear, I think, is greatly exaggerated. Under the terms of
Discover Bank itself, the court may not disregard a contractual choice-of
law provision solely because the chosen state' s law would undermine a fun

damental policy of California-as any collective action waiver now plainly

would. Rather, it must also be the case that, in the absence of any contrac

tual choice-of-law provision, California law would apply. This further
limitation surely protects the Golden State from itinerant plaintiffs ' lawyers

in search of favorable laws.

150

b. The Future of Unconscionability
On its face, the Discover Bank decision looks extremely promising from

the perspective of consumer groups, liberal commentators, and plaintiffs'

lawyers. The highest court of the nation's most populous state expressed the
commonsensical notion that collective action waivers are inexcusably op

pressive tools of corporate defendants seeking immunity from liability for
widespread wrongdoing. One can hear the sighs of relief-"finally !"

But the Discover Bank decision is already imperiled: one week before

the California Supreme Court entered its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court

granted certiorari in Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. to resolve a
split in the state and federal courts over whether a court or an arbitrator has

authority to determine the legality of an underlying contract containing an
arbitration provision. 1 5 1

148. The Discover court remanded the case for resolution of the choice-of-law issue. The
contract at issue designated Delaware law as controlling, but the court advised that should the trial
judge find that Delaware's acceptance of collective action waivers is "contrary to a fundamental
policy of California," the court must "then determine whether California has a 'materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue' " and that California's law
would otherwise apply but for the choice-of-law provision. Id. at 1 1 1 7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 87(2)(b) ( 1 97 1 )).
149. Id. at 1 1 1 8 (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[l]f California courts
must, or may, dishonor class action waivers that are perfectly valid under the governing law selected
by the parties themselves, California-which now takes a minority position on this issue-might
well become the magnet for countless nationwide consumer class action lawsuits that could not be
maintained elsewhere.").
1 50. A second interesting upshot of Discover Bank is that it calls into question the assump
tion-shared by this author-that the Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle precludes a court, as
opposed to an arbitrator, from ordering classwide arbitration where an agreement expressly prohibits
collective action. See generally infra Section 11.E.
1 5 1 . Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005) [hereinafter Buck
eye //], cert. granted,, 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (June 20, 2005) [hereinafter Buckeye Ill]; see also Andrew J.
Pincus & David Gossett, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, United States: Supreme Court Docket
Report, MoND AQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 8, 2005, available at http:www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp?
articleid=33564&print= l (noting that the Florida Supreme Court's decision is "consistent with
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In Buckeye, plaintiffs entered into "payday loan" arrangements with the
1 52
which included signing a contract containing an arbitration

defendant,

clause, and subsequently filed a class action against Buckeye for charging

"usurious interest from thousands of customers for consumer loans" in
15
violation of Florida law. 3 The parties disagreed over whether the FAA

required this challenge to be resolved by the trial court or the arbitrator. The
Florida Supreme Court concluded that the FAA does not preclude a state

court asked to compel arbitration from first deciding whether the contract at
154
issue violates state law.

Six federal circuit courts of appeal, on the other hand, have come to the
5
opposite conclusion, finding that under Prima Paint, 1 5 the illegality of an

underlying contract containing an arbitration clause is a question for the
156
arbitrator under the FAA and not the court under state common law. These

federal courts have all compelled arbitration and left it to the arbitral bodies

to resolve questions of illegality or fraud in the making of the contract.

So while the Buckeye controversy seems to revolve around a fairly nar

row doctrinal question-whether the FAA preempts state courts from
decisions of the Alabama, Minnesota, and South Dakota supreme courts," but that "all six federal
circuit courts that have considered the issue have reached the opposite result").
1 52.
Buckeye II, 894 So. 2d at 865 (Bell, J., specially concurring). According to the plaintiffs,
B uckeye was engaged in "what it falsely portrayed as a check cashing service," when in reality, it
"charged and collected unconscionably usurious interest" from consumers. Brief in Opposition to
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Buckeye l/l 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (2005) (No. 04- 1 264), available at
2005 WL 12856 1 5. Buckeye essentially loaned its customers money against their next paycheck or
government-issued check; customers "unable to repay these loans when due were permitted to ex
tend their debt or roll-over their loans with Buckeye by paying 'service fees.' " The fee on these
extensions "ranged from approximately 1 37% to 1 ,3 1 7 % A.P.R., and the rate was usually over 300%
A.P.R." Id. at 5-6.
1 53.
When the defendant moved to compel arbitration of the claim, plaintiffs countered that
the "arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is contained in an illegal usurious con
tract and is, therefore, void ab initio." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228,
229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter Buckeye I]. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs on the
illegality of the contract and denied Buckeye's motion to compel arbitration. Id. The intermediate
appellate court then reversed, finding the trial court erred in deciding the illegality issue because
plaintiffs' "challenge to the underlying contract's validity must be resolved by an arbitrator, not a
trial court." Buckeye II, 894 So. 2d at 862.
1 54.
Florida's highest court found that state "public policy and contract law prohibit breathing
life into a potentially illegal contract by enforcing the included arbitration clause." Buckeye II, 894
So. 2d at 864. In response to the court's ruling, payday lenders have lobbied the Florida legislature
to reconsider a bill that would prohibit customers from challenging these contracts in court
legislation that would essentially overturn the ruling in Buckeye. The proposed legislation, Senate
Bill 2242, was approved by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee in a 4-3 vote along party lines,
with Senate Democrats arguing the bill was "unfair to low-income consumers who can challenge an
illegal contract in court for nearly free due to legal services, but may have to split thousands of
dollars in arbitration fees if they can't go to court." Joe Follick, Payday Lending Bill Moves On,
SARASOTA TRIB., Apr. 1 3 , 2005, at BS6.
1 55.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 ( 1 967).

1 56.

See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance LLC, 400 F.3d 868 ( 1 1th Cir. 2005); Bess v.

Check Express, 294 F.3d 1 298 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d
63 1 (4th Cir. 2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 200 1 ); Harter v. Iowa
Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2000), amended by Nos. 98-301 0 & 98-3 8 1 7 , 2000 U.S. App.
Lexis 1 4467 (7th Cir. June 2 1 , 200 1 ); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1 1 59
(5th Cir. 1 987).
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entertaining illegality challenges to contracts containing arbitration clauses

there would seem to be no principled reason why Buckeye would not also

govern the issue of who decides whether an arbitration clause is unconscion
able under state contract law. Should the Supreme Court disagree with the

Florida court and find that arbitrators have sole authority to determine the le
gality of the underlying contract under the FAA, I would then expect the
lower courts to conclude that determinations on all state law contractual de

fenses to arbitration-including unconscionability-rest exclusively with the

arbitrator. Indeed, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank appears to
have anticipated and sought to head off this possibility: noting that the U.S.

Supreme Court had not yet addressed "the question [of] whether [the] deter
57
mination of unconscionability should be made by a court or an arbitrator," 1

the court asserted that such challenges are grounded in state common law and
58

are therefore best left to state courts to decide. 1

While it is impossible to predict what the Supreme Court will decide in

Buckeye, or the scope of its decision, the Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence

and penchant for giving arbitrators greater and greater authority raises the
distinct possibility that unconscionability may become a dead-end in efforts to
59

invalidate collective action waivers. 1

2. Facial Inconsistency ofArbitration with

Federal Statutory Rights
Another argument often made by first-wave plaintiffs' counsel was that

the collective action waiver is inconsistent with the provisions of the substan

tive federal statute being sued upon. One such statute is the Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA"), which unambiguously provides for class action litigation in the
60
In a series of cases, courts have upheld collective action

text of the statute. 1

waivers in TILA cases, in the face of plaintiffs' arguments that the waiver

1 57.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 1 13 P.3d 1100, 1115 (Cal. 2005).

1 5 8. Id. at 1113. The court went on to state that ''the FAA does not federalize the law of uncon
scionability or related contract defenses except to the extent that it forbids the use of such defenses to
discriminate against arbitration clauses." Id. at 1 1 12-13. Because, in the court's view, "California's rule
against class action waivers" does not target arbitration clauses, this rule cannot be preempted. Id. at
1112.
159. Professor Jean Stemlight is equally concerned about this outcome: "One of the really con
troversial issues is: Who decides whether arbitration itself is unconscionable--should it be a court or an
arbitrator who might be biased?" Molly Selvin, High Court Takes on Right to Sue, L.A. IlMES, June 25,
2005, at C l . Professor Sternlight also predicted that the Supreme Court would reverse the Aorida Su
preme Court. Id.
160.

Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1 693r (2000).
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irreconcilably conflicts with the statute's enforcement scheme. 161 For example,
2
in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 16 plaintiff asserted that:
Congress consciously i nserted language into the statutes with the intent of
encouraging district court j udges to certify class actions . . . . [and that] in
the legislative history of amendments to the TILA, Congress communi

cated that class action remedies play a central role in the TILA . . .

enforcement schemes . . . . [and further that] such litigation is meant to
serve public policy goals through plaintiffs who act as private attorneys
general, for the class action device is necessary to ensure meaningful de
terrence to creditors who might violate the acts.

163

The district court agreed with the plaintiff's argument on the "inherent

conflict" between the statutory language and the arbitration clause and
denied the motion to compel arbitration. 1 64 The Third Circuit reversed,
explaining that "while arbitrating claims that might have been pursued as

part of class actions potentially reduces the number of plaintiffs seeking to
enforce the TILA against creditors, arbitration does not eliminate plaintiff
5
incentives to assert rights under the Act." 16 After all, a plaintiff's individual
recovery is the same whether a case is brought as a class action or as an

individual suit. So while acknowledging that the plaintiff might be "correct

in arguing that Congress contemplated class actions as a part of the TILA

enforcement scheme, and even that class actions were self-consciously
promoted by Congress in amending the statute," 166 the court nonetheless

held that the arbitration clause did not defeat "TILA's goal of encouraging
private actions to deter violations of the act." 167
Other federal circuit courts have reached similar results. 168 As a conse

quence, it appears that a congressional enactment will not be found to be

1 6 1 . See, e.g., Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 0 1 - 1 752, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1027, at *4-5
(3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) (stating that because right to a class action is "merely procedural," and thus "may
be waived," an arbitration agreement barring classwide relief for claims brought under TILA is enforce
able); Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2003) (same); Sagal v. First
USA Bank, 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1 999) (compelling arbitration of plaintiff's TILA claims
even though he was precluded from representing a class), ajf'd, 254 F.3d 1078 (3d Cir. 2001).
1 62.

225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000) , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1 1 45 (2001).

1 63.

Johnson, 225 F.3d at 368-69.

1 64.

Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1 999).

165. Johnson, 255 F.3d at 374 ("The sums available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not
automatically increased by the use of the class forum."). The court also observed that arbitration
would not "necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers willing to pursue claims on behalf of debt
ors" because "[a]ttomeys' fees are recoverable under the TILA." Id.
166.

Id. at 373.

1 67.

Id. at 374-75.

1 68.
See Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 63 1 , 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (re
jecting plaintiff's claim that she would be "unable to maintain her legal representation given the
small amount of her individual damages" and concluding that there is "no violation of public policy
relating to consumer protection" in allowing TILA claims to be arbitrated) ; Randolph v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 8 1 4 , 8 1 8 (I I th Cir. 200 1 ) (finding that plaintiff failed to "establish that Con
gress intended to preclude the arbitration of TILA claims, even where arbitration would prevent the
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facially incompatible with a collective action waiver in the absence of a spe

cific statutory antiwaiver provision, which Congress has yet to include in
.
.
69
any l eg1s l attve enactment. 1
D. Second- Wave Challenges
None of this means, however, that a collective action waiver might not

be void where it serves, in the individual case, to prevent a plaintiff from
vindicating federal statutory rights. Beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,

110

the Court has repeatedly stated (albeit in

dicta) that there is one critical limitation upon the availability of arbitration

as a forum for the resolution of federal statutory claims: such claims may

only be arbitrated "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindi
1
cate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." 1 1 Looked at in

this way, Johnson and related cases hold only that the federal statutes are not
facially irreconcilable with the collective action waiver; that plaintiffs are
not necessarily and always precluded by the waiver from being able to vin
dicate their federal rights under this federal statute. Put another way:

plaintiffs' lawyers can concede that the right to engage in collective action is
a procedural and waivable right, and yet argue that where the waiver of that

right in the particular case precludes the plaintiff from being able to vindi
2
cate his substantive federal statutory rights, the waiver must fall. 1 7

And so, defeated but not deterred, plaintiffs' lawyers have begun to

launch a second-generation challenge, asserting that the collective action

waiver's implicit prohibition against spreading the costs of litigation or arbi

tration across multiple claimants precludes the individual plaintiff in certain

cases from being able to vindicate her federal statutory rights.

claims from being brought in the form of a class action" and that "Congress did not intend to pre
clude parties from contracting away their ability to seek class action relief under the TILA").
1 69.
The statutory antiwaiver provision would have to clearly reveal a congressional intent
that disputes be resolved in a judicial forum, even in cases involving otherwise binding arbitration
clauses. At one time, for example, the Supreme Court held that the antiwaiver provisions of the
Securities Act of 1 933 indicated that Congress had intended that parties had an absolute right to a
judicial forum, see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), but the Court has since overruled Wilko in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 ( 1 989), requiring a clearer
statement of congressional intent to trump the applicability of the FAA.
1 70.

473 U.S. 6 1 4 ( 1 985).

171.

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28 ( 1 99 1 ) (same); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 3 1 7 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003)
(en bane) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that statutory rights . . . may be subject to mandatory
arbitration only if the arbitral forum permits the effective vindication of those rights." (emphasis
added)).

See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI.
1 72.
L. REV. 1983, 1995 (2002) ("The treatment of statutory rights is different because of the public
interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights-an interest that is separate from private
parties' interest in resolving a dispute between themselves. In order for these rights to be submitted
to arbitration, the arbitration must allow effective vindication of them. Any arbitration of a statutory
claim that did not allow for effective vindication of rights would 'conflict[) with the statute's pur
pose of both providing individual relief and generally deterring unlawful conduct through the
enforcement of its provisions.' " (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
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The new challenges are rooted in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph, 1 73 where the Court recognized that the cost of prosecuting a par
ticular claim under a particular arbitration agreement may serve as the

predicate for finding that the litigant cannot "effectively vindicate" her

rights under the rule of Mitsubishi: "It may well be that the existence of
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicat

4
ing her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum." 17

The case law that has sprouted up under Green Tree holds that statutory

claims may be subjected to arbitration so long as the agreement at issue

does not force plaintiffs to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to "de
5
ter the bringing of claims." 1 7
The simple logic of this second-wave argument is that the collective ac

tion waiver-and particularly its implicit ban on spreading across multiple

plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals ' fees, and other dis

bursements-forces the individual claimant to assume financial burdens so
6
prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims. 1 7 In the absence of the waiver,

the claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers (or

have them advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice). In the presence of
the waiver, these costs fall on her alone. And these costs, in a complex

commercial case, will exceed the value of the recovery she is seeking. 1 77

A case sure to test this theory is currently underway in federal court in

New York, where numerous small retailers are seeking class treatment for
1 73.

531 U.S. 79 (2000).

1 74.

Green Tree, 5 3 1 U.S. at 90.

1 75.
Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 200 1 )
("[T]he appropriate inquiry i s one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum i n a particular case i s an
adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among
other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost dif
ferential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so
substantial as to deter the bringing of claims."); see Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'!, 324 F.3d 2 1 2, 2 1 7
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Third Circuit will follow the approach of Sixth and Fourth Circuits
in Morrison and Bradford, and striking provisions in arbitration clause that would have caused
plaintiff to incur prohibitive costs); Morrison, 3 1 7 F.3d at 658 (explaining that the inquiry is whether
"the arbitral forum under a particular arbitration agreement effectively prevents the vindication of a
plaintiff's statutory rights" and holding that a provision affecting the allocation of costs "should be
held unenforceable whenever it would have the 'chilling effect' of deterring a substantial number of
potential litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights" (emphasis added)); Martin v. SCI
Mgmt. L.P., 296 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Morrison and noting that, under
Green Tree, 53 1 U.S. 79 (2000), "significant arbitration costs could preclude a litigant from effec
tively vindicating her federal statutory rights in an arbitral forum"); Mildworm v. Ashcroft, 200 F.
Supp. 2d 1 7 1 , 1 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Wexler, J.) (following Bradford).
1 76.
As the Fourth Circuit held: "(T]he proper inquiry under Gilmer is not where the money
goes but rather the amount of money that ultimately will be paid by the claimant." Bradford, 238
F.3d at 556; see also Morrison, 3 1 7 F.3d at 660 (same).
1 77.
A somewhat related argument, available only in cases where the defendant enjoys "mar
ket power" within the meaning of the antitrust laws, is that the forced imposition of the collective
action waiver is, itself, an anticompetitive vertical restraint. This argument was rejected in Jn re
Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., No. 02-MD- 1468, 2003 WL 2 1254765, at * l (D.
Kan. May 27, 2003). More recently, the plaintiffs have made a similar argument in the American
Express litigation currently pending in federal court in New York. See Amended Complaint 'll'Jl 921 00, In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., No. 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23. 2003) (briefs
on file with author).
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antitrust claims against American Express, arguing that the out-of-pocket
cost of proving liability will by necessity run into the many hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more, while the median small merchant stands to
178
gain only $5,200.
It is not clear to what extent these second-wave challenges will find trac
tion in the federal courts. I suspect they will find some. What we do know is
that these arguments are fairly narrow, applying only to federal statutory
claims in which the unavoidable out-of-pocket costs of proving liability will
exceed the amount in controversy.
Finally, a more straight-to-the-jugular challenge to collective action
waivers is also underway. As discussed above, in the Ross v. Bank ofAmer
ica class litigation, plaintiffs will seek to show that defendants "combined,
conspired and agreed to implement" collective action waivers in cardholder
179
agreements and that such waivers are an anticompetitive restraint on trade.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants' unlawful conspiracy "in
hibit[s] competition and harm[s] consumers" by giving defendants a "non
price trade advantage, which would not be available in the absence of con
certed activity," and which "has resulted in supra-competitive profits by
shielding [d]efendants from liability arising from any illegal conduct or
180
practice." This challenge, if successful, could invalidate collective action
waivers involving consumer credit and charge cards, but would likely have
little impact in other industries that have independently adopted such waiv
ers.
E. The Chimera of Classwide Arbitration
One question that arises when a collective action waiver is struck
down-however common or rare an occurrence that may be-is "what hap
pens to the arbitration clause?" It is perfectly rational to suppose that an
arbitration clause may be enforceable while a collective action waiver con
tained within that clause is unenforceable, either because it is
unconscionable under the circumstances or because it renders a federal sub
1 81
stantive right impossible to vindicate. One would then suppose, in such a

1 78.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration at 14, In
Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003) (arguing that
"expert witness fees and other out-of-pocket costs that are necessarily incurred in a case of this
nature, exclusive of class related expenses, are at least $ 1 million," while the median "small mer
chant plaintiff incurred $ 1 ,75 1 in actual damages during the four-year statutory period, or $5,252 in
treble damages").
1 79.

Complaint 'l[ 2, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05-CV-7 1 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

1 80.

/d. at 'l[ 1 27.

181.
Courts have traditionally severed unconscionable or unenforceable provisions i n agree
ments to arbitrate disputes, thereby allowing the dispute to go to an arbitral panel without the
offensive terms. See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 289 {3d Cir. 2004)
(remanding for a determination of whether complained-of provision is unconscionable and must be
severed); McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding unconscionable arbi
tration provision that gave employer exclusive choice of arbitrators and remanding case to determine
whether the provision could be severed from the remainder of the agreement); Morrison v. Circuit
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circumstance, that a court would strike the collective action waiver and yet

enforce the arbitration clause, sending the case off to class wide arbitration
a procedure for which all of the major arbitral bodies maintain specific
rules.

For a time, this option of court-ordered classwide arbitration looked to

be a sensible way to show the requisite "healthy regard" for arbitration

while respecting the value of collective legal action. For example, in Szetela

v. Discover Bank,

182

the California court ruled the collective action waiver

unconscionable, but then refused to strike the provision altogether; instead,
3
it severed the class-waiver provision from the arbitration clause 1 8 and left
4
plaintiffs to pursue their claims in a classwide arbitration. 1 8 Other courts
faced with arbitration agreements that were silent as to classwide arbitration

have similarly ordered class claims to proceed in the arbitral forum. 1 85

In 2003, however, the Supreme Court took the classwide arbitration

compromise off the table for federal and state court judges. In Green Tree

Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,

186

the Court held that a court may not direct arbi

trators to entertain an arbitration on a classwide basis where the agreement

is silent regarding class arbitration; rather, it is uniquely for arbitrators to
decide whether to allow classwide arbitration. 1 87

City Stores, Inc., 3 17 F.3d 646, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (en bane) (finding agreement's cost-sharing
provision unconscionable and severing unenforceable provisions from the agreement).
1 82.

1 1 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002).

1 83.

Szetela, 1 1 8 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.

The California Supreme Court recently reiterated in Discover Bank, that "[u]nder Cali
1 84.
fornia law, . . . class arbitration may be authorized, even when a contract of adhesion forbids it,
because a class action waiver may be unconscionable." Discover B ank v. Superior Court, 1 1 3 P.3d
1 100, l l l5 (Cal. 2005).
1 85.
See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1 192, 1 207--08 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that
individual arbitration of claims would seriously prejudice the interests of plaintiffs, the court or
dered classwide arbitration to "give expression to the basic arbitration commitment of the parties");
Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998); Dickier v. Shearson Leh
man Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 199 1 ) (interpreting the words "any controversy"
in the parties' arbitration agreement to include classwide arbitration); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Sun Life Assurance Co., 2 1 0 F.3d 77 1 , 774-76 (7th Cir. 2000); New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 , 5, 8 (I st Cir. 1988).
1 86.

539 U.S. 444 (2003).

The plurality stated that the issue was for the arbitrator because the clause a t issue con
1 87 .
tained "sweeping language" committing all disputes between the parties to arbitration and granting
the arbitrator "all powers" provided by the law and the contract. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 45 1 , 453. The
plurality also noted that:
In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not arbitrators,
to decide a particular arbitration-related matter . . . . They include certain gateway matters,
such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.
The question here-whether the contracts forbid class arbitration-does not fall into this nar
row exception. . . . [T]he relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the
parties agreed to. . . . [That question] concerns contract interpretation and arbitration proce
dures. Arbitrators are well situated to answer that question.

Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted). But see Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robertson Ill, Substance, Proc
ess, and the Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REY. 409, 422 (2004) ("[T]he Court's
decision [in Bazzle] represents a significant departure from the prevalent trend in judicial
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For corporate defendants, then, the Bazzle ruling alleviated the concern

of judges ordering classwide arbitration, but raised another concern by mak
ing clear that arbitral bodies are free to order classwide arbitral proceedings .

I t i s bad enough, from the corporate perspective, to engage i n "bet-the

company" class action litigation without having to sacrifice the appellate

rights and other safeguards that attend judicial proceedings, including inter
88
locutory appeals of class certification decisions. 1
Predictably, corporate defendants have begun to protect themselves after

Bazzle by making explicit in all collective action waivers that classwide ar
8
bitration is not permissible. 1 9 Articles have appeared in trade journals

encouraging corporate counsel to "consider supplementing the class action

waiver . . . by limiting the arbitrator's authority to resolve individual dis
putes involving just the plaintiff and the company." 190 With that safety-net
language, even if a court were to invalidate the waiver, leaving the arbitra

tion clause silent on the question of class treatment, the arbitrator "would
still be contractually bound to arbitrate nothing more than the plaintiff's

individual claim." 191

Somewhat less predictably (or not, depending upon the level of one's

cynicism) the major arbitral bodies appear to also have ridden to the rescue

of concerned corporate counsel. The American Arbitration Association
("AAA")-purportedly based upon its reading of Bazzle-issued a "Policy

on Class Arbitration" in 2003 that allows its arbitrators to administer class

wide arbitrations only where "an order of a court directs the parties" to the
2
Association. 19 Corporate counsel, however, need not fret: under Bazzle,

thought. . . . [as a]ppellate courts [have] traditionally agreed that determination to certify a class
should lie with trial courts rather than arbitrators.").
188. See, e.g. , Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update: Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. B azzle Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 Bus. LAW. 1 265, 1 272-73
(2004) ("Because courts on the whole are vastly more experienced than arbitrators in administering
class action procedures, most companies faced with the prospect of class arbitration would likely
prefer to remain in court rather than navigate through the uncharted waters of class-wide arbitra
tion."); Eric Mogilnicki, Class A rbitration Ruling a Bad Mistake, AM. BANKER, July 1 5 , 2005, at 1 7
("Class arbitration i s unappealing to businesses because i t combines the high stakes of class actions
with the relatively informal procedures found in arbitration. Rules that make sense when individual
cases are at stake-like limits on appeals-make no sense when hundreds of millions of dollars
could be at issue.").
-

1 89.
As one commentator notes, "During oral argument, Justice Stevens opined that Bazzle
would not have any future significance because 'isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agree
ments in the future will prohibit class actions?' Indeed, one would expect sophisticated drafters to
expressly prohibit class arbitration in all post-Bazzle contracts." Avery, supra note 109, at 26; see
also Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, Using Express No-Class Action Provisions to Halt
Class-Claims, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2005, at 3 ("In response to Bazzle, and the non-trivial risk that an
arbitrator will entertain class or collective actions in the absence of such a clause, many employers
have begun incorporating explicit 'no-class action' clauses into their employment alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) programs.").
190.

Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 1 88, at 1 273.

191.

Id.

1 92.

The AAA's classwide arbitration policy provides that pursuant to Bazzle:

Cn he American Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration . . . if
(I) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall
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no court has the authority to issue such an order in the first place. The

NAP-which helped develop and promote the collective action waiver in the
93
1 94
first place 1 -has followed smt.
•

In a surprising set of developments, JAMS, the third-largest private arbi
95
announced in November 2004 a new policy to allow class wide

tral body, 1

arbitration even where the arbitration clause explicitly prohibits it. JAMS '

decision to disavow collective action waivers "was made out o f concern that
the prohibitions unfairly curtail the rights of consumers and employees in
9
volved in an increasingly large number of class action arbitration claims." 1 6

The move immediately angered its corporate clientele, some of whom accused
JAMS of trying to "insert itself as a guardian of social policy" by interfering
1 97
with the freedom to enter into contracts.
A number of these clients, includ

ing Discover and Citibank, swiftly changed their contracts to remove JAMS as

be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the [AAA's] rules, and (2) the agreement
is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.
The Association is not currently accepting for administration demands for class arbitration . . .
unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute to submit their dispute to
an arbitrator or to the Association.
Am. Arb. Ass'n, Rules and Procedures: American Association Policy on Class Arbitrations,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22254 (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
1 93.

See supra notes 1 24-125 and accompanying text.

In the wake of Bau.le, the NAF created a Class Claim Resolution Program, which pro
1 94.
vides for class wide arbitration "(a) by a written agreement between the parties; or (b) by court
order." N AT ' L ARB. FORUM, CLASS CLAIM RESOLUTION PROGRAM (2003), http://www.arb
forum.com/arbitration/pdfs/Class-Claims-Res-0203.pdf. NAF's position should not be surprising
given its role in developing and advertising the benefits of collective action waivers to its clients.
See, e.g. , Complaint 'll'lI 1 2 1-23, Ross v. B ank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2 1 , 2005).
1 95.
JAMS, which is headquartered in Irvine, California, handles approximately 30,000 cases
a year in its twenty-six Resolution Centers around the country, employs more than 1 65 individuals,
and lists more than 200 full-time neutrals, many of whom are former judges and prosecutors. JAMS
Won 't Restrict Class Action Right, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., Dec. 29, 2004, at 1 . In com
parison, the AAA has thirty-four offices in the United States and Europe, and is widely viewed as
the industry leader in private arbitration. See Am. Arb. Assoc., About Us, http://www.adr.org/About
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
Justin Scheck, New JAMS Rule Rejects Ban on Class Actions, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 1 5 ,
196.
2004, at 4.
1 97 .
Sue Reisinger, New JAMS Policy Has Angered GCs, Nat'! L.J., Jan. 24, 2005 , at 8.
Commentators were confounded by the new policy, given that JAMS was certain to lose money if its
clients decided to go elsewhere for its arbitration needs. Some posited that, in the short term, JAMS
could realize large fees by acceptance of classwide arbitrations. See Sue Reisinger, GCs Squeeze
JAMS Over Class Action Rule, RECORDER (S.F.), Jan. 1 8, 2005, at 1 ("[T]the potential costs of arbi
tration would certainly rise if the process is opened up to include class actions."). It is also possible
that since the new policy affected only those disputes between consumers and businesses-a small
number compared to business-to-business arbitrations which make up the bulk of private arbitra
tion-JAMS may have believed that the financial consequences of it new policy would be minimal,
while potentially winning it many friends in consumer advocate groups, employment experts, plain
tiffs' lawyers and others. See, e.g., id. ("Not surprisingly, plaintiff lawyers want the AAA to copy
JAMS's policy. Cliff Palefsky, a spokesman on arbitration issues for the National Employment Law
yers Association, says his group has asked the AAA to ignore class action arbitration bans. A partner
at McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky in San Francisco, Palefsky believes that employers have unfairly
used arbitration as a way to avoid expensive class actions by their employees. Workers, he main
tains, have more clout in an arbitration when they negotiate as a group than as individuals.").
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Then, in March 2005, in a

somewhat less surprising move, JAM S abandoned its policy of not enforcing
class action waivers in arbitration clauses, citing "confusion and concern"

over how the policy would be applied and criticisms that it undermined the
99
neutrality of the arbitration process. 1
More likely, the pressure put on

JAMS by its corporate clients was too much to bear.

200

All three of the major arbitral bodies now have official policies that al

low for classwide arbitration where an underlying agreement explicitly

provides as much (even if this is unlikely ever to occur), rather than barring

classwide arbitration altogether. This makes some sense: judges seeking to

respect an arbitration clause and yet invalidate a class waiver may direct the
parties to proceed to arbitration with the proviso that, if the arbitrator refuses

to accord class treatment, the parties may return to court and the arbitration

provision will be stricken as a whole. Arbitral bodies want to insure against

this scenario: even in the wake of the recent JAMS tum-around on classwide

arbitration, it may be that as collective action waivers proliferate, the arbitral
bodies will see the potential for very large fees generated by their accep

tance of some classwide arbitrations. While some (and perhaps all, if one

j udges by JAMS ' response) of these bodies will surely determine they are

better off catering to their repeat corporate clientele, others may perceive a

market opportunity in accommodating courts seeking ways to balance the
need for collective action with the policies of the FAA.

III. THE RE ACH OF C OLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS
The vast potential reach of collective action waivers is, I think, entirely

unappreciated by courts and commentators. Upon examination, collective

action waivers have the capacity to derail putative class actions brought un-

1 98. See Erick Bergquist, JAMS Backs Down on Class Action Arbitration, AM. BANKER, Mar.
I I , 2005, at I ("Several credit card companies, including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., the Discover
Financial Services, Inc. unit of Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Inc., informed borrowers recently that
JAMS would no longer be an option for arbitration."); Mike McKee, What Can Customers Really

Waive?: Courts to Examine Legality of Arbitration Agreements that Ban Class Actions,

RECORDER

(S.F.), Apr. 7, 2005, at 1 (reporting that Discover and Citibank had written JAMS out of their con
tracts in protest of the new policy).
199.

Erick Bergquist, supra note 204.

200.
JAMS' decision to reverse its class arbitration policy may also have been affected by the
ruling in Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1 278, 1 289 (M.D. Ala. 2005), in which the
court found that a JAMS arbitrator had overstepped his authority by ignoring express contractual
language prohibiting class arbitration. The court also held collective action waivers valid and en
forceable, id., a ruling which may have impact on Alabama and Florida state-court determinations
that such waivers are unconscionable. See, e.g., Cardegna v. B uckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So.
2d 860 (Fla. 2005), cert. granted, 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (2005); Leonard v. Terminix Int'! Co., 854 So. 2d
529 (Ala. 2002). As Alan Kaplinsky, an attorney best known for urging his corporate clients to insert
collective action waivers in their contracts and for defending these waivers against legal challenges,
self-interestedly noted, "This well-reasoned opinion eviscerates the legal underpinning of the JAMS
policy . . . . This will hopefully prompt JAMS to reconsider the wisdom of its policy." Posting to
http://www.adrinstitute.com/edit/Feb_05/0 1 3 105Gipson.htm (Jan. 3 1 , 2005) (quoting Kaplinsky);
see also Erick Bergquist, Loan Arbitration Clauses Upheld in Appeals Court, AM. BANKER, Feb. 24,
2005, at 9 (quoting Kaplinsky as saying that the Gipson ruling shows that "JAMS was wrong and
didn't have the right to determine the validity of class action waivers").
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der consumer, antitrust, securities, employment, and civil rights statutes,
2
among other areas. 0 1 The waiver is viable wherever a contractual relation

ship connects the claimant to the defendant. And the nature of the

contractual relationship required to do the trick has changed tremendously

in recent years, as we have witnessed an unprecedented judicial willingness

to find assent in shrink-wrap, scroll-text, and box-stuffer notices, and an

unprecedented comfort level with "pay-now-terms-later" transactions.

The potential reach of collective action waivers, then, has been vastly

extended, as courts have moved from a consent-grounded theory of contract
to a utilitarian, economist's model, in which overall, systemic efficiency

gains are more highly valued than the quaint, Williston-era preoccupation
2
with volitional assent. 02 Whatever one thinks of these developments, the
implications for collective action waivers are portentous. The project in this

Part is to explore the reach of the collective action waiver, in large part by
23
focusing on shifting judicial notions of consent. 0
A. Locating the Contractual Predicate for Waivers
Upon examination, it is apparent that sufficient contractual bases for the

imposition of arbitration clauses and class waivers, under current doctrine,
are present in virtually all areas of contemporary class action practice.

20 1 . See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering " to Arbitrate Through Pre
dispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS.,
Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 56 ("Arbitration is no longer the province of sophisticated participants.
Instead, individuals pursuing long-established statutory claims, such as those brought under the
federal securities and antitrust laws, and newer but long-sought civil rights claims, including race,
sex, age, and disability discrimination, may now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to
have assented to a pre-dispute arbitration clause.").
202. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679,
679-80 (2004) (noting that standard-form agreements, which epitomize the modem view of con
tract-without-consent, are economically efficient because they facilitate "mass marketing of goods
and services by creating one-size-fits-all contracts, the cost of which can be amortized over numer
ous transactions," "permit sellers more readily to monitor a substantial sales force by avoiding
variations in contract terms," and "facilitate interpretation both by parties to the contract and third
party interpreters").
Of course, a less benign interpretation of the movement from consent to efficiency might begin
by observing that the newfound judicial willingness to find offer and acceptance is pretty much
limited to vertical, top-down contracts imposing arbitration, as opposed to being applicable to all
efficiency-enhancing transactions, however those might be defined. I am not aware, for example, of
any trend towards dispensing with traditional requirements of consent in the context of agreements
between business interests.
203.
Importantly, this project is totally distinct from the liberal or "constitutionalist" critique
of arbitration agreements, which argues that courts inappropriately apply a private law, objective
standard of consent in evaluating arbitration agreements instead of the subjective standard that ap
plies in other contexts (for example, plea bargains or jury waivers for the knowing waiver of the
constitutional right to a jury trial). That is, the constitutionalist critique, thoughtfully elucidated by
Professors Jean Stemlight and Stephen Ware, does not accept the application of contract law stan
dards at all in this area. Here, by contrast, I take them as a given and look to see just where they may
lead us. See Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 Omo ST. J. ON D1sP. RESOL. 669 (200 1 ) ; Stephen J. Ware,

Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167.
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1 . Consumer Cases
Other than securities cases, which are discussed separately below, no
area of law generates more class actions than consumer cases. Consumer
actions, of course, are hardly monolithic. The term encompasses actions

against mortgage lenders, credit card companies, commercial banks, and
others under truth in lending and fair credit statutes; unreasonable charges
claims against telecommunication carriers under the Federal Communica
tions Act and state analogues; deceptive trade practices and false advertising
claims against manufacturers and service providers; and numerous other
actions.
An attribute shared by most or all of these consumer actions is a con
tractual relation, be it direct or via a retailer or middleman, between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The contractual relation is obvious in most
cases: for example, cellular-phone service subscribers, mortgagees, and
credit card holders receive actual, old-fashioned contracts which may con

tain the collective action waiver. 204 It is less obvious that a consumer who
buys a computer in a box (or a toothbrush, or plane ticket) may have en

gaged in a transaction effecting the waiver of her right to participate in a
class action or sue in court. And yet, under current doctrine, there is little

question that ordinary retail purchases of goods-whether in-store or by
telephone or internet-may support the imposition of an arbitration clause
and collective action waiver.
One leading and somewhat controversial decision on this point comes
from Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. In Hill v. Gateway

2000, Inc. ,

205

a putative consumer class action, the plaintiff bought a com

puter over the telephone; when it arrived, inside the box was a brand new
computer, the usual assortment of wires and cables, and a pamphlet contain
ing "terms and conditions," which included an arbitration clause. This
document provided that the customer could return the computer within
thirty days; otherwise, he would be deemed to have agreed to the terms.
When the computer stopped working two months later and Gateway refused
to repair or replace it, the plaintiff sued. Gateway defended by pointing to

the arbitration clause which, it argued, required plaintiff to give up his right

to sue and instead to take any claims against Gateway to one-on-one arbitra
0
tion. 2 6
In a decision that encapsulates the move from a consent-based to an effi

ciency-based

theory

of contract

law,

Judge

Easterbrook

upheld the

arbitration provision:
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transpor
tation, i nsurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considerations

204.
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 201 , at 65-66 (describing a study of consumer contracts
with included arbitration provisions: 100% explicitly prohibited class actions in a judicial forum,
and 30% explicitly prohibited classwide arbitration).
205.

1 05 F.3d 1 147 (7th Cir. I 997).

206.

Hill, 1 05 F.3d at 1 148.
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support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their prod
ucts. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct
sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of
terms before taking the buyer 's credit card number, the droning voice
would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others
207
would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time.

This excerpt, I think, represents the apotheosis of the economist's ap

proach to contract law. The only value here is efficiency; consent is
0
irrelevant. 2 8 Judge Easterbrook postulates that the price of establishing

meaningful consent-in the explicit, meeting-of-the-minds sense of the
0
word-would be to grind contemporary commerce to a halt. 2 9
w
Whether or not Hill v. Gateway 2000 was rightly decided,2 Judge
Easterbrook's view reflects the dominant perspective in this area of the
law. 2 1 1 As a matter of current doctrine, there is nothing to stop a corporate

defendant from contracting around default legal rules by placing a unilateral

207.

Id. at 1149.

208. See Gillette, supra note 202, at 681 ("Assent typically reflects some arrangement to
which there has been mutual agreement created by negotiations or conduct more explicit than open
ing a box or using a product that is accompanied (unknown to or ignored by the user) by a recitation
of obligations. If we impose obligations under these circumstances, then we do so in spite of the
absence of a formal agreement rather than because of it. To the extent we enforce these additional
terms, we do so because we think that the parties either would or should have agreed to them or to
terms sufficiently similar that it would not have been cost-effective to bargain for the alternative.").
209. Id. at 687 (suggesting that store clerks who had to warn consumers that more contract
terms were coming their way "could undermine the very benefits that rolling contracts purport to
provide. The ensuing colloquy concerning the forthcoming terms between an inquisitive buyer and
an operator is more likely to create buyer agitation than enlightenment").
210. I rather suspect that if the law required store clerks to read all contract terms in order to
make them binding, there would simply be no custom terms, beyond price and quantity, in retail
transactions. There is nothing anomalous about a termless transaction; most transactions fall into
this category.
I am not alone in criticizing the Hill decision, and other courts have come out differently on
similar issues. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105--06 (3d Cir. 1991)
(refusing to enforce warranty limitations printed on outside of software package, where terms dif
fered from those in purchase order; treating limitations on package as additional terms proposed by
manufacturer and never accepted by purchaser); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to enforce terms contained inside a box for a personal computer
because plaintiffs did not expressly agree to the terms and were not informed of the manufacturer's
policy that failure to return the computer within five days constituted agreement).
211. As stated by the district court recently in O 'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, L.P., 256 F. Supp.
2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003): "[O]ther federal and state courts have come to similar conclusions [as
Judge Easterbrook] under similar factual scenarios, which were all premised on the consumer hav
ing the opportunity to return the product in order to avoid any term or condition that he found to be
unacceptable." See also Lozano v. AT &T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (D. Mass. 2002); Moore
v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000 , Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d
569, 572 (App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999). In other words, these courts have found nothing overwhelmingly objectionable in
the "money now, terms later" approach to sales of consumer goods. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
implicitly bought into this reasoning in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587
(1991), where it enforced a forum selection clause that was printed on the back of a ticket received
by passengers in the mail subsequent to a ticket purchase.
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notice into a computer box, a monthly statement, or any other conduit. 212 It
makes no difference whether or not the consumer would expect to find terms
and conditions in these places because consumer expectations have no place
13
Indeed, even where consumers did not receive arbitration

on this view. 2

provisions in their original consumer contracts, courts have routinely held

the continued use of a product (such a credit card) or failure to opt-out of a
waiver (by returning, for example, a computer), indicates assent to all terms
14

and conditions. 2

The import of the reasoning in Hill and other such cases, when coupled
5
with judicial solicitude for collective action waivers, is profound. 21 There is
nothing, as a matter of current law, to prevent companies from unilaterally

imposing a fully enforceable waiver of the right to collective action in all
6

manner of consumer transactions. 21

This means, among other things, that all of the many billions of dollars

paid in recent years to settle consumer class actions could have been
avoided; cigarette companies should be kicking themselves (not to mention

2 1 2.
See Gillette, supra note 202, at 682 (noting that cases upholding such unilateral contracts
"appear motivated by the utility and practicality of easy forms of contracting," while cases refusing
to enforce these agreements may base their holdings on the failure to find assent, but are "more
rooted in a conclusion that the practice or the terms that [the contract] generates are offensive than
in a belief that fealty to contractual rituals is important").
2 1 3.
Witness Judge Easterbrook's dismissal of the Hill plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish an
other Seventh Circuit case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1 447 (7th Cir. 1 996), which gave
binding effect to an arbitration clause in a software license contained in a box of software diskettes.
Rejecting the argument that a consumer entering into a software licensing transaction ntight expect
to encounter such terms, while the purchaser of a consumer good ntight not, Judge Easterbrook
wrote simply: "Plaintiffs ask us to lintit ProCD to software, but where's the sense in that?" Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1 147, 1 149 (7th Cir. 1 997). The lesson is unntistakable: consumer
expectations have no part in the analysis.
2 1 4.
One intermediate appellate state court-with no reasoning or analysis whatsoever
relied on Hill to hold that even where a consumer credit contract ontitted an arbitration clause alto
gether, the defendant could still invoke arbitration based on a unilateral mass mailer that it
subsequently sent to its customers, providing that their continued use of the card would constitute
assent to the new term. Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'! Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 2004). On
this logic-which is not in fact supported by Hill-a bank could send a consumer a bill-stuffer
notice that if she continues to use her credit card, the bank acquires the right to, say, purchase her
home. While there exists a body of law governing unilateral change in terms provisions-see infra
text accompanying notes 248-250--there is clearly no justification for decisions such as Tsadilas,
which would extend the Hill rule beyond recognition. See also Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div.
1 998) (same).
2 1 5.
As one commentator has noted, Judge Easterbrook's decision in Hill essentially "ruled
that no contract had been formed when the Hills ordered their computer and gave their credit card
number in payment," but instead, "the terms of Gateway's form contracts deterntined the process of
offer and acceptance." Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common
Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 , 1 9 (2004). As such, Easterbrook "assumed Gateway was only offer
ing to sell and specifying that the form of acceptance was the Hills' keeping the computer for thirty
days, even though that 'offer' was not communicated to the Hills at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful fashion--0n the telephone, for example." Id.
2 1 6.
See Gillette, supra note 202, at 689 ("[The main concern about standard-form contracts]
is that sellers systematically take advantage of their position to draft terms to which informed buyers
would object. Much of the existing literature perceives SFCs as a zero-sum game in which the
seller-the only party who participates in the drafting process-seeks to obtain as much as possible
from the nonreading buyer and thus systematically incorporates proseller terms into the agree
ment.").
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their outside counsel) for failing to impose collective action waivers through

the simple expedient of shrink-wrap text. Indeed, reading Class Action Di

lemmas, the RAND Institute' s much-cited empirical study, it strikes me that
each of the consumer-related class action case studies chronicled in the re

port could have been totally avoided by the imposition of unilateral notices
2
with consumer goods. 1 7 Consumers buy goods; goods have packaging;

packaging may contain waivers of exposure to collective actions; therefore,
the seller of goods need never be exposed to collective action by consumers.
2. Antitrust Cases
The potential reach of collective action waivers in the area of antitrust is

even more extensive; indeed, it is total. I would venture that all federal anti

trust class claims-representing a significant percentage of class action
filings and a large chunk of all settlement dollars-are subject to the waiver,

for the wholly fortuitous reason that the restrictive antitrust standing rules

developed over the past twenty-five years ensure that, in the class context,

the only persons with standing to bring antitrust suits are those with direct
contractual ties to the defendant, making the imposition of collective action
.
2
waivers e lementary. 18

Invariably, antitrust class actions are brought by purchasers of goods or

services. The paradigmatic antitrust class action nowadays is a suit by pur

chasers alleging horizontal price-fixing; somewhat less common are the
cases alleging that some vertical restraint-for example, a tying arrange

ment or a group boycott-had the effect of restricting competition and
raising prices . But either way, antitrust class cases are purchaser cases. Ac
tions by competitors remain an important source of antitrust enforcement,

but they do not lend themselves to class treatment: competitor plaintiffs are

very unlikely to be so numerous as to require class treatment, and, in any

event, the question of whether any given competitor suffered "antitrust in

jury" will presumably be too fact-specific to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). Thus,
while a competitor antitrust class action would likely be impervious to col

lective action waivers, given the lack of a contractual nexus, that is a lot like
saying Martians are impervious to the SARS virus.

217. This also applies to companies who do not sell packaged goods directly to consumers.
For example, in the Contact Lens Pricing Litigation---one of the RAND case studies-defendant
Bausch & Lomb could have instructed optometrists that its contact lenses may only be distributed to
the end user with a printed notice containing a collective action waiver. See Hensler et al., supra
note 1 1 , at 1 45-69. The same is true of manufacturers of blood clotting products for hemophiliacs,
also featured in the RAND study, who could have required all hospitals which use their product to
obtain informed consent from patients before treatment. Id. at 293-3 17. Of course, where the mid
dleman fails to act as agreed upon, the manufacturer may be relegated to a contract claim against the
middleman. See id. at 145-69.
2 1 8. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that only the "overcharged direct
purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his
business or property,' within the meaning of the [antitrust statutes]." 43 1 U.S. 720, 729 (1977); see
also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 5 1 9
( 1 983).

418

Michigan La w Review

[Vol. 104:373

Not only are all antitrust class actions brought by purchasers, but under

2
Illinois B rick, 19 only "direct purchasers"-that is, those that bought directly
from the antitrust defendant-will have standing to assert federal antitrust

claims. Downstream purchasers, or "indirect purchasers" in the parlance of
antitrust, may not bring federal antitrust actions (although some fifteen or so

states allow indirect purchasers to bring suits under limited circumstances
22
under state antitrust laws). 0 The upshot is that the only people who can

bring an antitrust class action in federal court are those upon whom collec
tive action waivers may most easily and directly be imposed.

It follows, stunningly, that all of the many billions of dollars paid out in

antitrust class action settlements and judgments are avoidable. A case-in

point is the massive tying class action against Visa and MasterCard, which

ended in 2003 with a record $3 .05 billion settlement in favor of a merchant
22
class led by Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and others. 1 If the Visa/MasterCard

member banks had simply included collective action waivers in their stan

dard-form merchant agreements, this mammoth liability would never have
222
B y contrast, a roughly similar class action filed by small
been incurred.
merchants in 2003 against American Express may never get off the ground

for the simple reason that AmEx does include collective action waivers in
223
their standard-form merchant agreements.

3 . Civil Rights, Employment, and Entitlement Cases
In general, civil rights actions are certainly much farther removed from

contract law than are antitrust or consumer cases. But many contemporary
civil-rights cases, while not bottomed on contractual theories, implicate con
tractual relationships that are capable of communicating effective collective
224
action waivers.

Title VII cases, which have long "typified the sort of civil rights action

that courts and commentators describe as uniquely suited to resolution by
225
class action litigation,"
often involve a contract-based employment relation-

2 1 9.

Illinois Brick, 43 1 U.S. at 729.

220. See California v. ARC Arn. Corp . , 490 U.S. 93 ( 1 989) (concluding that allowing recovery
for indirect purchasers under state antitrust laws would not conflict with the policies expressed in

Illinois Brick).
22 1 .

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005).

222.
Of course, Wal-Mart and Circuit City-both plaintiffs in the antitrust litigation-would
probably not have agreed to a collective action waiver in their negotiations with Visa and Master
card. While it must be fairly typical to force all types of waivers and other remedy-stripping
provisions on small merchants, large companies such as these have far greater bargaining power and
are able to negotiate custom agreements, rather than merely acquiesce to standard-form contracts.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 1 76-178 (discussing American Express's attempt to
rely on those collective action waivers in a case currently before the Southern District of New York).
224.
See generally Mara Kent, "Forced" vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims,
23 LAW & INEQ. 95 (2005) (reviewing cases and legislation on arbitration of civil rights claims).
225.
Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 8 1 3 , 8 1 3 (2004).
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226
(and some
ship. While arbitration of employment disputes i s nothing new

scholars have staunchly defended the use arbitration in the employment
227
the potential for collective action waivers to curtail most, if not

context)

all, employment class actions seeking broad-scale changes in the U.S. work
228
Aggressive employers such as Circuit

place is a more recent phenomenon.

City have already used collective action waivers to avoid classwide exposure
229
Brokerage houses, which have recently paid
in the employment context.
23
out high settlements to avoid jury trials in gender-discrimination cases, 0

have long used arbitration clauses to shield themselves from classwide li
23
ability in employment claims; 1 one would expect these entities to soon add
232
collective action waivers to ensure their immunity. And the newfound abil
ity of employers to notify employees of arbitration clauses via mass emails
233
will make it far easier to impose these waivers.
Finally, while employment

226.

Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.

HuM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 ( 1 998) ("For decades, private arbitration has been the vehicle of choice

for unions, and it has worked well in this context.").
227.
See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to A rbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 344 ( 1 997); Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and
Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 Omo S T. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 735
(200 1 ).
228.

See, e.g. ,

ALAN F. WESTIN

& ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

WITHOUT LITIGATION 4-5 ( 1 988); Lisa B. Bingham,

Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion
Employment Disputes?: An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT.
369 ( 1 995). Some commentators have argued that arbitration has enormous benefits for employees
because it is cheaper and faster than litigation. These studies have typically focused on individual
claims such as wrongful discharge, rather than class-based claims.
229.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (200 1 ) (endorsing mandatory arbitration
of employment claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 ( 1 990) (same); see
also Miriam A. Cheny, Whistling In the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implica
tions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1 078-79 (2004)
("[C]ourts have shifted from viewing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts with suspicion to
distinctly favoring them. In part this can be explained by the fact that enforcing mandatory arbitra
tion contracts frees the federal courts from having to deal with a considerable volume of
employment litigation."). However, in California, Circuit City's attempts to impose collective action
waivers on employees have twice been rebuffed by the federal courts on unconscionability grounds.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v Mantor, 335 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 328 F.3d 1 1 65 (9th Cir. 2003).
230.
See, e.g. , Emily Thornton with Mara Der Hovanesian & Jennifer Merritt, Fed up-and
Fighting Back, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 2004, at 100 (reporting on a number of high-profile gender
discrimination suits against Wall Street brokerage houses, including the record $54 million dollar
settlement of such claims by Morgan Stanley).
23 1 .
Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 60 1 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 1993), cert. denied, 5 1 0
U.S. 993 (1 993) (compelling arbitration o f race- and gender-discrimination claims brought against a
brokerage firm).
232.
There is already authority for the proposition that brokerage firms may enter into private
agreements with employees that bypass the current regulatory regime. For example, in Credit Suisse
First Boston, LLC v. Padilla, 326 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the court held that brokerage
firms may enter into agreements with employees that replace arbitration by a self-regulating organi
zation (such as the NYSE or NASO) with arbitration by the AAA, NAF, or JAMS. But see Credit
Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Pitofsky, 768 N.Y.S.2d 436 (App. Div. 2003) (finding that SEC rules
require self-regulating organization arbitration for employment disputes against all member firms).
233.
See Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 ( 1 st Cir. 2005). In
Campbell, a former employee sued for wrongful discharge under the Americans With Disabilities
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suits are seemingly immune from collective action waivers where based on

at-will rather than a contractual relationship, there is little to stop employers
from forming contracts containing "at-will" terms and collective action
24
waivers. 3
•

Title IX cases (regarding education) are likewise amenable to collective

action waivers. There is no reason, for example, why educational admissions

materials could not include the waiver. The same goes for the leases, mort

gages, and other contracts that tie the plaintiffs in Fair Housing Act cases to

the defendants in those actions. Nor is there any doctrinal reason-given the

state of current law-why government entities could not avail themselves of
waivers to avoid class action liability in a broad array of cases, including

employment, housing, entitlement, and education-related class actions.

Political constraints are another matter: I imagine that many government

officials would not be comfortable opting out of the government's own dis

pute-resolution system. But I can also imagine this sentiment changing-at
least insofar as class actions are concerned-as waivers in other areas be

come more common, and as opportunistic politicians seize upon an easy
issue ("My opponent is for big class actions against the taxpayers; I ' m
25
against them !"). 3

Of course, there are other civil rights cases that do not implicate contrac

tual relations,

including

cases

concerning prison conditions,

taxation,

zoning, police misconduct, and so forth. While many types of civil rights
actions have become very difficult to maintain, owing to the Prison Litiga

tion Reform Act,

the restrictive

"equitable

standing rule," and other

Act. The defendant moved to compel arbitration arguing that the employee was bound by a manda
tory arbitration clause included in a company-wide email. The court held the arbitration clause had
not been agreed to, but strongly suggested that all that was needed to make such a clause effective
was to require a response acknowledging receipt and acceptance of the new policy. Id.
234.
Not that employers haven't tried to insert such waivers into employee handbooks or other
materials, but courts have been surprisingly sharp in determining whether employment manuals and
other "orientation day" detritus containing arbitration clauses are valid. See, e.g., Ramirez-de
Arellano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 133 F.3d 89, 90 ( ! st Cir. 1 997); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper
Corp., 1 1 9 F.3d 756, 76 1-62 (9th Cir. 1997); Gallos v. FIC Am. Corp., No. 02 C 6328, 2003 WL
2 1 804258, at * 1 -2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1 4, 2003); Phox v. Atriums Mgmt. Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 279,
1 282-83 (D. Kan. 2002); Snow v. BE&K Constr. Co., 1 26 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Me. 200 1 ); Trumbull v.
Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683, 685-86 (N.D. Ohio 1 998); Phox v. Allied Capital Advis
ers, Inc., 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 809, 8 1 0 (D.D.C. 1 997).
To some extent, this issue has come up with Government-Sponsored Enterprises
235.
("GSEs"). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both congressionally chartered companies, guarantee
mortgage-backed securities in order to maintain liquidity and stability in the secondary mortgage
market. In response to concerns by consumer groups and others, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
announced in 2004 that they would cease purchasing mortgage loans that contained mandatory
arbitration clauses. Fannie Goes to Bat for Buyers, BAt.T. SUN, Oct. 1 0, 2004 at IL ("While Fannie
Mae does not believe arbitration provisions are inherently abusive, we believe that mandatory arbi
tration can be used in an abusive fashion" (quoting a Fannie Mae spokesperson). These actions
prompted a number of private mortgage lenders to follow suit. See Erick Bergquist, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 3 1 , 2005 at I (reporting that the decision by Wells Fargo, Citibank, and Countrywide Financial
Services to stop using collective action waivers was "largely caused by the decision last year by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to no longer buy loans with such clauses").
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such cases are, I think, impervious to class action waivers,

and so form an irreducible stump of class action practice.

4. Other Commercial Cases
Other major areas of class action practice include-for lack of a better

term---c ommercial cases in which the claimants challenge the defendant's

practices under, say, an insurance agreement (such as the numerous class

filings aimed at Marsh & McLennan, piggybacking on the investigation by
237
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer)
or a franchise agreement (wit
ness the infamous Meineke Muffler verdict of one hundred million dollars,

which inspired the movement to look to arbitration as a way of insuring
23
against large class action verdicts). 8 Clearly-indeed, paradigmatically
such cases lend themselves to collective action waivers.

It is also possible that, at some point, collective action waivers could re

strict class actions in cases against securities firms. Currently, customer
claims against broker-dealers are governed by rules promulgated and admin

istered by the various exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")

and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASO") have thus

adopted procedures for the arbitration of customer claims which prohibit
class claims in the arbitral forum, but also bar member firms from enforcing

an arbitration agreement against a customer who has initiated a class action
23
in court. 9 In approving these rules, the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion ("SEC") opined that:

[C]lass actions are better handled by courts and . . . investors should have
access to the courts to resolve class actions efficiently. In the past,
individuals who attempted to certify class actions in litigation were subject
to the enforcement of their separate arbitration contracts by their broker
dealers. Without access [to] class actions in [appropriate] cases, both

236.

See Gilles, supra note 1, at 1 4 14.

237. In 2004, Spitzer sued Marsh & McClennan Companies, the nation's largest insurance
brokerage firm, for bid-rigging and price-fixing. As of this writing, the investigation continues, and
thus far, two Marsh & McClennan executives have pleaded guilty to criminal charges. See generally
Marcia Vickers, The Secret World of Marsh Mac, Bus. WK., Nov. 1 , 2004, at 78 (discussing
Spitzer's investigation and the "several class actions" that sprung up in the aftermath of the attorney
general's announcement).
While insurance-contract class actions are, by and large, vulnerable to the waiver, one area of
class action litigation sure to survive any proliferation of collective action waivers is found in insur
ance claims under the laws of Kansas, Georgia, and a handful of states that have enacted statutes
expressly prohibiting the arbitration of claims arising out of insurance disputes under the authority
granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 1 01 (2004). See, e.g., Mut. Reins. Bureau v.
Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 93 1 , 933 ( 10th Cir. 1 992) (finding Kansas statute expressly
invalidating arbitration clause contained in insurance contract was not preempted by the FAA). Such
state laws have been held not to be preempted by the FAA. See, e.g., McKnight v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,
358 F.3d 854, 857 (1 l th Cir. 2004) ("In the right circumstances, the McCarran-Ferguson Act pro
vides an exception to the general rule of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.").
238.

See supra note 1 2 1 (discussing the multimillion dollar verdict against Meineke Motors).

239.
See Arbitration Rules: Rules 600-639, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE , at 'l[ 2600,
Rules 600(d), 636 (2004); Code of Arbitration Procedure, NASO MANUAL, at 'lI 3710, §§ 1 2(d)(2),
1030 l (d)( l ) (2004); see also Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
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investors and broker-dealers have been put to the expense of wasteful,
24
duplicative litigation. 0

But there is nothing to keep broker-dealers from including a collective

action waiver in their contracts with customers. If they were to do so, cus
tomers would be unable to bring class actions in court and would instead be

forced to bring individual claims in the NYSE or NASD' s arbitral forum.

And the current regulation, prohibiting exchange members from enforcing
an arbitration agreement against a class member, would be rendered mean
ingless.

Another burgeoning area of commercial class action litigation that may

be vulnerable to collective action waiver are claims arising under ERISA,
including suits against corporate pension trustees which shadow securities
24
fraud cases. 1 In these ERISA class actions, employees and retirees allege

that the company and its directors breached their fiduciary duties by know

ingly issuing false financial statements, which induced employees or their

ERISA plan fiduciary to invest and maintain their plan assets in company
stock at artificially high prices. ERISA class actions against Enron, World

Com, and other infamous corporate debacles have been filed by employees

whose retirement and stock savings plans were heavily invested in the com
22
pany's now-decimated stock. 4 But, as with broker-dealer agreements, there
is no doctrinal reason why pension documents could not contain collective

action waivers ; corporate fund managers just haven't adapted yet. Given the

current state of the law, there would seem to be no reason why pension trus

tees (and indeed, all fund managers) would not wake up and insulate

themselves from billions of dollars in potential class liabilities.
5 . The Special Case of Securities Fraud

While the advent of collective action waivers may soon doom the avail

ability of class actions against Wall Street brokerages, fund managers, and
other investment professionals, the undisputed king of the class action jun

gle is the Rule lOb-5 suit against a securities issuer by plaintiffs who

240.

Exchange Act Release No. 34-3 1 37 1 , 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, at 52,661 (Nov. 4, 1 992).

Nowadays, when an Enron or WorldCom scandal strikes, not only do the company's
24 1 .
stockholders have a viable class claim against the corporation and its agents, but the company's
pensioners often have an equally viable claim against the pension "plan fiduciary," which is gener
ally a committee with membership that overlaps with that of the company's board. As many
journalists have noted, there has been a disturbing trend in recent years of plan fiduciaries investing
significant portions-sometimes 1 00%--of fund assets in the stock of the corporation. See Mary
Williams Walsh & Jonathan D. Glater, Pension Fund Trustees Taking Aim at Safeway, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2004, at C4. And of course, where the plan fiduciary body contains the company's CEO or
other insiders, it is chargeable with knowledge of the wrongful activities of the company. As a result,
the emergence of ERISA suits as a follow-on to major securities fraud suits is becoming more and
more common. See Mary Williams Walsh, Concerns Raised over Consultants to Pension Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2 1 , 2004, at I .
242.
See, e.g. , In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and "ERISA" Litig., No. MDL-1446 Civ.A H-01 -3624, 2002 WL
3 1 845 1 1 4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002).
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23
purchased shares on the open market. 4 And here, on the surface at least, it

would appear the class action's march towards extinction breaks its stride in

a meaningful way. In particular, it would appear that collective action waiv

ers are impotent to penetrate the realm of classic l Ob-5 litigation. There is

simply no contractual relationship of any kind between the plaintiff and the

defendant. The corporate issuer of securities contracts only with a syndicate

of brokers, and even then only when it has a public offering. Remaining
sales are transacted on a secondary market between strangers.

And yet, the classic securities fraud case may nonetheless be ripe for in

filtration by collective action waivers. To appreciate how this could happen,

it is necessary to look critically at the structure of other transactions in

which courts have enthusiastically located enforceable arbitration agree
ments and collective

action

waivers.

Courts following the reasoning

exemplified in Judge Easterbrook's Hill decision have not hesitated to rec

ognize binding arbitration clauses that obligate a plaintiff-consumer to
arbitrate claims against a defendant-manufacturer, where the clause was
2
contained inside (or on) a box that she bought at a third party retailer. 44 On

this three-sided model, there is not necessarily any contract between con
sumer and manufacturer (although there may be a warranty or some ongoing
service component); the only real contract is between the consumer and re

tailer. All that really matters to the court is that the consumer acts (or
refrains from acting) while on notice that the terms and conditions estab

lished by the manufacturer include arbitration. It is a fiction to speak of an

"agreement" to arbitrate between the plaintiff and the manufacturer, al
25
though courts often do. 4 What judges really mean is that the manufacturer
243.

As Professor Sternlight explains:

[T]he securities industry has long been a major proponent and advocate of binding arbitration
in general, its policies foreclose arbitration of class actions and instead allow investors to
litigate such claims. In adopting the exclusion . . . the SEC foreclosed the possibility that
companies might be permitted to deprive customers of the class action device simultaneously
in both litigation and arbitration forums. The rule barring arbitral class actions was
unanimously adopted in I 992 by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA").
One by one the various individual brokerages secured SEC approval for the same rule.
The SEC opposed arbitration of class actions because whereas courts already had developed
rules for handling class actions, arbitral organizations had not. It found that allowing arbitra
tion of class actions would be wasteful and duplicative. In approving later versions of the
exclusion of class actions from arbitration, the SEC frequently reiterated that it "is an impor
tant initiative to protect investors and the public interest."
Sternlight, supra note
244.

I O I , at 45-48 (footnotes omitted).

See, e.g., Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003) (compelling arbitra

tion of claim brought by mobile home purchaser against manufacturer, even where manufacturer
was not party to the retail installment contract in which the arbitration clause appeared).
245.

In

Ross

v.

Bank of America,

for example, plaintiff cardholders allege that they never

entered into valid and binding agreements to arbitrate disputes:
While defendants agreed between and among themselves to impose arbitration clauses, plain
tiffs and other members of the class did not affirmatively agree to accept them. Defendants
imposed the arbitration clauses on their cardholders in a manner designed to avoid detection by
cardholders. The clauses were either engrafted onto existing cardholder agreements through
change in terms notices or buried in the cardholder agreements of new cardholders. By hiding the
arbitration clauses in change in terms announcements and cardholder agreements, defendants did
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clearly announced the terms and conditions that attach to its product, and
the consumer-on notice of those terms-accepted the product or elected
not to return it. The requirement of privity is replaced by a "notice-plus246
acceptance" test.
So if I am right-if we are entering a world where the requisite "agree
ment" to arbitrate is satisfied by notice-plus-acceptance of the product
then the door may be open just wide enough to impose collective action
waivers in the classic l Ob-5 fraud-on-the-market context, provided that there
is sufficiently clear notice. And clear notice shouldn't be very difficult at all.
I can imagine, for example, a NASDAQ website listing companies who have
elected to "opt out" of class action exposure. Perhaps (somewhat formalisti
cally) courts would require securities to bear legends reflecting the opt out.
Certainly, actual notice could easily be provided by issuers to the stock ex
changes, investment banks, and brokerage houses, all of which might be
obligated to notify their customers in some broad fashion. Ultimately, com
panies could simply amend their corporate charters to give notice of the
247
collective action waiver.
Now, lest we get ahead of ourselves, there are strains of recent case law
that push back against the creep towards a "notice-plus-acceptance" test for
arbitration agreements. This issue comes up, for example, in cases where
companies send out unilateral amendments to consumers under "change-in
terms" provisions-that is, contractual clauses that give companies the right
to alter the terms of the agreement on written notice to the consumer. Some
lower courts in recent years have refused to compel arbitration where an
arbitration provision was sent to the consumer pursuant to a "change-in
terms" provision, reasoning that the addition of a new provision requiring

not reasonably inform their cardholders of the arbitration clauses or their consequences. Either
way, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class did not "agree" to the arbitration clauses. The
clauses are never signed by any "party" to them. Silence on the part of cardholders is not evi
dence of an "agreement" to arbitrate.
Complaint 'll'l! 1 25-26, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2 1 , 2005).
246.

Professor Stephen Ware describes this as a "hub-and-spoke" version of contracting:

[A]utomobile insurance companies could have an enormous impact on negligence law if all
their insurance policies had arbitration clauses making all the company's other policyholders
third-party beneficiaries. Then an auto accident involving, for instance, two Allstate customers
would go to arbitration, not litigation. If all the insurers contracted with each other, they could
extend this arbitration system to accidents involving customers of different insurers. . . . Nor
would insurers have to be the only hub of hub-and-spoke arbitration agreements. A magazine
could be a hub with spokes connecting all its subscribers. Mastercard could be a hub with
spokes connecting all its cardholders.
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83
MINN. L. REV. 703, 752 (1 999) (footnote omitted).
24 7. Under Delaware law (and the law of many other states as well) corporations may amend
their corporate charters to insulate themselves from liability for breach of the duty of care. These
"waivers" are binding against all shareholders. DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2003). This could
prove to be a sufficient statutory basis for imposing a collective action waiver.
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arbitration goes well beyond the alteration of existing contractual terms,
2
which would be a permissible "change-in-terms." 48
29
Numerous other courts, however, have reached a contrary result, 4 and,

even more significantly, Delaware (whose law would be designated to con

trol the contracts of any Delaware-chartered bank or corporation) has

enacted a statute that expressly authorizes the addition of arbitration clauses
2
through change-in-terms provisions. 50
In the end, then, I think the cases refusing to recognize unilaterally im

posed arbitration clauses are no more than speed bumps on a road inevitably
2
leading away from traditional contract principles in the area of arbitration. 5 1

Courts have already recognized a number of circumstances under which
nonsignatories may be bound to arbitration agreements, including the as

sumption by a nonparty of rights and responsibilities under a contract that
22
contains an arbitration clause. 5 This is not a distant leap from a doctrine

holding that a collective action waiver "travels with the stock," as part of the
basket of rights purchased by the shareholder in the open market when he

purchases a company's common stock.

B . How the Waiver May Come to Rule the Earth
It seems inevitable that more and more companies will come to under

stand that class action exposure is largely optional under current doctrine.

The penetration of collective action waivers is relatively miniscule today,

248.
See Stone v. Golden, Wexler & Samese, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004); Long v.
Fid. Water Sys., Inc., No. C-97-20 1 1 8, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7827, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 26,
2000); Badie v. B ank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1 998); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827
A.2d 358 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 200 1 ); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 426
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
249.
See Bank One, N.A. v. Williams, No. 3:01 CV24-D-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272 1 7
(N.D. Miss. April 30, 2002); B ank One v. Coates, 1 25 F. Supp. 2 d 8 1 9 (S.D. Miss. 2001 ) , aff'd
without opinion, No. 0 1 -60059, 34 Fed. Appx. 964 (5th Cir. April 5, 2002) (Ohio law); Herrington v.
Union Planters Bank of Miss., 1 1 3 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000), aff'd without opinion, 265
F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001 ) ; Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1 4 10 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(relying in part on Alabama and Utah statutes that permit unilateral amendment but do not refer
explicitly to whether that method can be used to add an arbitration clause); SouthTrust Bank v.
Williams, 775 So. 2d 1 84 (Ala. 2000) (Alabama statute permits unilateral amendment but does not
address whether arbitration clause can be added this way); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793
N.E.2d 886, (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (Arizona law).
250.
See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2005) (Delaware statute expressly authorizes addi
tion of arbitration clause through this method).
25 1 .
And of course, as collective action waivers proliferate over time, there will be less need
to impose such clauses through unilateral change-in-terms provisions. Such unilateral amendments
simply accelerate the pace at which the waivers may become commonplace.
252.
The Second Circuit, for example, has thus far recognized five theories for binding non
signatories to arbitration agreements: 1 ) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency;
4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and 5) estoppel. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. Smith
Cogeneration Int'!, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1 999); Thomson-CSP, S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 64
F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1 995); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385,
401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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but the visible tip represents a whopping and seemingly unavoidable ice
berg.
Several factors will conspire to speed the waiver's rise. For one, in the
wake of Bazzle and the announcement by all three major arbitral bodies that
their arbitrators may not sua sponte order classwide arbitration, most com
panies that have arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers or
253
employees suddenly, automatically, have collective action waivers as well.
Second, the ability of companies to unilaterally impose waivers via change
in-terms provisions under the law of Delaware and other key states has been
a huge boon to many of the largest banks and other institutions that regu
larly face broad exposure to consumers, allowing the banks to impose these
terms on existing (and not just new) relationships.
Another factor here is the tight-knit business lobby, with their regular
conferences and publications, all of which grease the skids for the fast de
velopment of procorporate legal ideas, once they reach a certain tipping
point. And I do expect a tipping point, where it becomes perfectly clear to
the broader business community that their interests demand the full-scale
imposition of collective action waivers in all of the ways discussed above
and others not yet considered. Most likely, this watershed moment will be
precipitated by a major court decision-for example, if AmEx earns a free
pass through its collective action waivers, whereas Visa and MasterCard
were forced to pay $3 billion.
54
One might ask: why hasn't this happened yeti I am not entirely sure,
but I offer a few observations. First, the collective action waivers are of
fairly recent vintage, and have not been much tested by appellate courts.
Relatedly, I think these waivers are fairly counterintuitive to liberally trained
lawyers: a common reaction is "that can't be permissible." So I suspect there
is some reluctance on the part of general counsel to rush into a perceived
violation of applicable law. I also suspect that, for some fairly small subset
of companies-the Ben & Jerry's of the world-the imposition of a collec
tive action waiver in contracts with employees or consumers might serve to
255
undermine the company's investment in its public image and good will.

253. See supra text accompanying notes 189-196 (discussing the response by the three major
arbitral bodies to the Supreme Court's ruling in Green Tree).
254. Again, it is entirely possible that many more companies have inserted collective action
waivers into their contracts and onto their packaging materials in recent years. But impressionisti
cally, it appears that the early adopters have been fairly sophisticated entities; full penetration of the
waiver, then, is not yet complete. Indeed, current data indicate that even standard predispute arbitra
tion clauses are not as common as one would imagine. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 20 1 , at
56 (finding that among the consumer contracts studied, only those in the financial services industry
consistently contained arbitration clauses); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" A rbitration Clauses,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695 (finding that less than half the franchise agreements studied contained
arbitration clauses).
255.
See supra note 235 (discussing announcement by congressionally chartered governmen
tal corporations refusing to accept mortgages containing mandatory arbitration clauses in effort to
befriend consumer rights organizations).
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Other possible rationales are less convincing. While certification of a
256
settlement-only class is sometimes a useful way to achieve global peace, it
seems unlikely that a company would expose itself to class liability just to
keep that option open-after all, if this option were so important, firms
could provide in their contracts that the parties waive the right to participate
257
in all collective actions except for settlement classes.
Nor do I believe that firms refrain from imposing waivers to cause buy
ers to pay more today for the right to litigate collectively tomorrow. Such an
argument assumes, for one thing, that consumers are aware of the existence
259
258
of collective action waivers. They're clearly not. And even if they were,
it is not clear that consumers would attach a negative value to the waivers at
the time of contracting. I rather expect that, viewed ex ante, the prospect of
class litigation always appears very remote-and certainly too remote to
260
affect the price of the product.
But none of this explains why arbitration agreements are not currently
261
in wider use in consumer and even employee agreements. My own view is
that, before the collective action waiver issue arose, arbitration did not mat
ter all that much. Sure, there is value for companies in being in arbitration
262
as opposed to litigation, but the avoidance of class actions is a much big
ger deal. And so, previously, there was no overwhelming incentive to push
the envelope by, for example, including arbitration agreements on shrink
wrap or in packaging; or by issuing written "at-will" employment contracts
to hourly employees containing arbitration clauses. Now there is.

256. See, e.g. , Judith Resnik, Statement Prepared for Public Hearings Considering Proposed
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23: Procedural Challenges: Revising the Class Action Rule, at 1 2
(Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (noting that "some defendants have come to welcome certifica
tion of a class as a useful tool for them to reach closure on a set of problems of a plaintiff class").
257.
It is also striking that the companies with the most to gain from settlement classes
phone companies, credit card companies, and the like-are precisely the firms that have decided
most aggressively to implement collective action waivers.
258.
It also assumes, quite implausibly, that marketers would trumpet the possibility that the
consumer might some day wish to engage in class action litigation against the company.
259. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that consumers rarely read contracts, or
understand the various terms and conditions which they "agree" to when purchasing goods and
services. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1 1 73 ( 1 983). These informational asymmetries only become starker with the increas
ing tendency of companies to place the terms and conditions of sale in scroll-text, envelope stuffers,
and other such media. See also Complaint CJ[ 3, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 2 1 , 2005) (asserting that "most cardholders are wholly unaware of the existence, Jet alone the
implications, of the arbitration clauses").
260. There is a rich behavioral economics literature on the consumer's ability to discount the
future in ways that may end up appearing irrational. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Be
havioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1 55 1 , 1 568 ( 1 998).
26 1 .

See generally Demaine & Hensler, supra note 20 1 ; Drahozal, supra note 254.

262. Reisinger, supra note 1 97, at 8 (noting that general counsels "have Jong relied on arbitra
tion as a way to keep legal costs down since it's traditionally been viewed as cheaper than
litigation").
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C. Political and Policy Considerations
I have made clear my view that courts are likely to prove hospitable to

collective action waivers for as far as the eye can see. Judicial attitudes do
change, as we have seen, but they change slowly. The views of Judges Pos
ner and Easterbrook on the legal issues discussed in this Article may rule the

roost today, but they were decades in the hopper. Certainly, I do not see any

judicial attitude shift in the offing that would cause courts to swing back to a
more consent-centric view of contract or to elevate the interest of compen
sating small plaintiffs over concerns with overbearing settlement pressures.

Another possible limiter here is Congress, which could pass legislation

providing that the procedures of Rule 23 may not be waived, or may not be
waived in a standard-form agreement. While such an approach surely has

the virtues of clarity and efficiency, the issue is likely moot for the time be

ing: the 2004 election results make it unlikely that Congress will be

disposed to curtail the ability of companies to opt out of classwide exposure
any time soon (although it is certainly possible that, as part of the horse

trading to be carried out in a major litigation reform package, class action
23
anti-waiver legislation could come into play). 6
It is also theoretically possible that, should the waiver continue to sur

vive legal challenges and fail to inspire legislative attention, the executive

branch might step in to fill the enforcement vacuum created by an absence
2
of collective litigation. 64 Courts, in upholding the validity of collective ac

tion waivers, seem to derive comfort from the abstract notion that "[e]ven if

plaintiff cannot bring a class action, the Attorney General . . . [could] bring
an action to enforce" the plaintiff' s and other similarly situated claimants'
.
2
nghts. 65

263. From the perspective of trial lawyers and their Democratic allies, agreeing to litigation
reform proposals would seem a small price to pay for obtaining an antiwaiver amendment to Rule
23. Whether they will correctly perceive the relative value of antiwaiver legislation, however, is
anybody's guess. I am likewise not sure that businesses and their Republican allies will correctly
appreciate the stakes. Certainly, the relatively scant attention paid to collective action waivers to date
makes me think that it is still possible for either side to make a monumental mistake in evaluating a
measure that could, by and large, determine the future viability of class action litigation. See
Stemlight, supra note I O I , at 1 5- 1 6 ("It is rather amazing that, despite its clear importance, the
phenomenon of using arbitration to avoid class actions has received scant public attention. It has not
been focused upon in Congress, in the popular press, or even among arbitration scholars. For exam
ple, the relationship between class actions and binding arbitration has not been addressed in the
[FAA] or in the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). Similarly, no state arbitration statute contains
specific provisions dealing with the treatment of class actions." (footnotes omitted)).
264.
Professor Resnik, in a statement prepared for hearings considering proposed amend
ments to Rule 23, noted that, should the executive branch step in, "the reliance on the private bar for
such regulatory work could be reduced." Resnik, supra note 256, at 14 (discussing a 1979 Justice
Department proposal "for legislation to authorize it to bring small dollar value claims on behalf of
injured individuals").
265.
Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'! Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Div. 2004); see also
Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 1 59, 1 7 5 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
Louisiana state statute that allows the state attorney general to intervene as a plaintiff on behalf of
consumers).
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In any event, assuming that collective action waivers ever do receive

critical attention in Congress or the executive branch, the binary political

question presented is: are collective action waivers a good thing or a bad

thing? And the antecedent theoretical question is, what set of norms does
one draw on to decide whether we ought to allow waiver of collective ac

tion?

Certainly, we can anticipate a boilerplate economic argument in favor of

recognizing collective action waivers, asserting that class action exposure

entails costs, and that consumers-given the choice-may opt to waive their
right to collective action if that meant cheaper goods and services. But the

standard economic critique is totally unilluminating here: consumers may

very well opt for the lower prices and sign the waiver. But if we buy this

argument, then why not allow companies to require consumers (and em

ployees and pensioners and so forth) to waive all prospective liability (or,

say, a waiver of liability under TILA, or Title VII, or ERISA, or the

Sherman Act) in exchange for a reduction on price, or a bump up in wages,
266
But current

or what have you? Consumers will do it; I take that as a given.

legal doctrine doesn't allow it: as a matter of public policy, we prohibit pro
spective waivers of federal statutory liability.

267

We are therefore left with policy questions that must be answered on

their own terms: shall we allow, in standard-form agreements, broad waivers

of prospective substantive statutory liability? Waivers of the right to seek
money damages, or injunctive relief? Of the right to proceed collectively?

Each of these deserves a real answer.

C ON C LU SION
The question on the table here-whether to enforce collective action

waivers-totally and inevitably collapses into the question of whether class

actions are a good thing or a bad thing. After all, on what theory might we

uphold the right of companies to broadly impose collective action waivers,

and yet oppose the repeal (or radical overhaul) of Rule 23 itself? The obvi

ous answer, in any other context, would be freedom-of-contract principles.

But here, the freedom-of-contract answer is unavailable. It was not "con
sent" or a "meeting of minds" that Judge Easterbrook found lying on the

bottom of a computer box in Hill v. Gateway 2000; it was economic effi
ciency.

266. See, e.g. , Lary Lawrence, Toward a More E;fficient and Just Economy: An Argument for
Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 8 1 5 , 8 1 7 , 824-25 (1 987) (discussing
asymmetric information, unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer preferences).

267. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 n.19
( 1 985); see also David Schwartz, supra note 1 1 2, at 53-54 ("Under common law principles and
numerous statutes, prospective waivers of substantive rights are generally disfavored. . . . Courts
generally refuse to enforce contract clauses whose effect is to exempt a party from liability for its
own future fraud or intentional torts, violations of statute, and injuries caused by gross negligence or
recklessness. Common law doctrine is particularly restrictive of prospective waivers where a regu
lated party seeks to limit its liability to the party benefiting from the regulation-such as consumer
or employment contracts." (citations omitted)).
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And so, we are back to the question of whether having class actions at
all is efficient or desirable. To a large extent, the answer to this question de
pends on one's view of the values that collective action litigation promotes
in our legal system.
My intuition, again, is that class actions do far more good than harm; that
many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely because the palpable
threat of class action liability hangs in the boardroom. I think it also indisput
able that class actions serve a vital compensatory goal: in most cases, class
members "would not likely have received any monetary compensation absent
268
a class action." As the Supreme Court recognized thirty years ago in Eisen

v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:
A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner 's individual stake in the
damages award he seeks is only

$70. No competent attorney would under

take this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount.
Economic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or
not at all.
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The use of class actions to fight racial discrimination, achieve equality
in the workplace, and tackle consumer fraud illustrates that these suits can
achieve public goals, both by compensating victims and deterring future
wrongful conduct. For these reasons, and because no genuine freedom-of
contract interests are served by collective action waivers, my own view is
that the waivers should not be enforceable. Allowing companies to simply
opt out of exposure to collective litigation is no more defensible than a sys
tem in which corporations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to
federal antitrust, securities, or civil rights laws. Indeed, it is less defensible,
insofar as collective action waivers will invariably be buried in a mountain
of terms and conditions, while substantive liability waivers might be ex
pected to garner some attention.
The scholarship on class action practice has thus far consisted of doc
trinal critiques, letters to Congress, moralist manifestos and economists'
prescriptions for optimized class action rules from many of our great schol
ars. With the class action rule itself a seemingly permanent fixture on the
legal landscape, scholarly attention has naturally been drawn to optimizing
the legal rules that govern its operation. But with the advent of collective
action waivers, the issues that face class actions have changed and the ques
tions that scholars ask must also change. Do we allow companies to opt out
of all potential classwide liability, or don't we? My hope is that we will see
significant scholarship focused on this elemental question. Because sud
denly, the question matters.

268.
Id. at 467 ("In most of the consumer class actions, the amounts at stake were small
enough that most lawyers would not have taken non-class cases.").
269.
4 1 7 U.S. 1 56, 1 6 1 (1974); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809
( 1 985) ("Class actions . . . may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to
litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $ 100 per plaintiff;
most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.").

